Military Intelligence

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from the
Commander

by Maj. Gen. Julius Parker, Jr.

The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff have designated 1985 as the Year of Army Leadership. As I assume command of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, I look forward to working with the "Military Intelligence Team" and the superb leaders who comprise the Army of Excellence. Given the many challenges which continue to confront us, the Year of Army Leadership represents a great opportunity for Military Intelligence leaders at all echelons to assess their leadership styles and techniques and practice the Army's "BE, KNOW, DO" leadership doctrine.

The "BE, KNOW, DO" leadership doctrine supports the Army's leadership goal which is to have a total Army whose leaders at all levels possess the highest ethical and professional standards committed to mission accomplishment and the well being of our soldiers. In our field, the highest professional and ethical standards are extremely critical. The intelligence we provide drives the Army in combat and field commanders expect us to provide the most reliable and accurate intelligence information possible. The achievement of this virtue is one that must be earned now during peace so that in war confidence in our product is the routine rather than the exception. The BE part of the "BE, KNOW, DO" leadership doctrine keys in on this part in a number of ways. As leaders we must BE competent, professional, BE committed to the job at hand, BE courageous and BE "integrity personified." The KNOW part of the leadership doctrine emphasizes the need to KNOW the enemy terrain and weather aspects. We also must KNOW ourselves, KNOW our job, KNOW our unit, KNOW human nature, and above all KNOW our soldiers. We need to KNOW the strengths and weaknesses of our soldiers, KNOW how our people respond to stress, and KNOW what motivates them. The last statement of the leadership doctrine is the principle which sets it into action. The DO aspect of the doctrine emphasizes the ability of leaders to provide direction to our soldiers and units. We DO this through sound problem solving, decisionmaking, and planning and management techniques.

Intelligence has one function: to enable our field commanders to apply their power with assurance and to achieve success in battle with minimal loss of life. We as intelligence leaders must focus on reducing the uncertainties of the battlefield. Uncertainties of the battlefield—the enemy, weather, terrain, and ourselves—constitute the fog of war which reduces command initiative and increases command vulnerability. It is our challenge to penetrate this fog and enable our tactical commanders to see the battlefield with certainty and to provide the leverage needed to win.

This challenge describes our mission. Its accomplishment is dependent on training and unit readiness. The training focuses on our soldiers and their ability to combine their individual skills to form a collective team and unit capability designed to properly execute stated and implied missions to include the intelligence cycle. We, the leaders, need to know what training our soldiers require and to be proficient enough ourselves to judge when mission ready status is attained, keeping in mind what is required for skill maintenance.

All of these points address the key tenets of the "BE, KNOW, DO" leadership doctrine of our Army. Let us take the time during this year of leadership to develop, maintain or improve our leadership abilities to ensure our preparedness to accomplish the intelligence mission in peace and war. Our success in this endeavor is a function of preparedness; however, preparedness is a function of quality training and taking care of soldiers; and, quality training and taking care of soldiers is a function of quality leadership. Let us as MI leaders set the example for the Army in this regard. Our soldiers deserve the best. *Toujours en avant*—Always out front!

HOME OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

from the
CSM

by CSM Robert H. Retter

Today, more than ever before, supervisors must fuse their knowledge with state of the art technology to prepare tomorrow's leaders. The Computer Based Education Center (CBEC) provides instructors and students the opportunity to develop military intelligence skills. The CBEC is a step towards the development of top-notch intelligence professionals.

The mission of the CBEC is to provide computer based training support to the Intelligence Center and School, provide Microfix software support, and provide hardware and software for computer literacy training. Computer based education entails the use of computers to assist, present, and manage instruction. Computer based education is normally divided into three areas: computer assisted instruction, computer supported learning aids, and computer managed instruction. Computer assisted instruction is a teaching method using computers to instruct. A computer presents instruction to students, accepts and responds to student input, and controls the lesson flow from pre-programmed decision points.

Current Microfix computer assisted instruction packages include the *Think Red* series threat lesson. This lesson covers Soviet and Korean weapons, equipment, organization and offensive and defensive tactics. Another lesson recently released is *Speak Red*, a collection of Soviet military terms and phrases. *Speak Red* consists of an introduction to military terms and phrases not normally taught during language training.

Jet Propulsion Laboratories also developed *Think Red Korea III*. This is a lesson on offensive operations. It was scheduled to be sent out to various commands in August 1985. Another package is titled *How to Analyze*. This package is designed to teach the process of intelligence analysis by provoking logical thought patterns. It was sent out in July. All of these computer assisted instruction packages are designed to be utilized with the Microfix computer systems to improve the quality of training. More than 300 copies of each package have been distributed throughout the MI community.

It is the responsibility of the supervisor and each leader to use these packages to improve intelligence skills. Using every facet of technology is a part of being a true MI professional.

LEAD BY EXAMPLE

Behind the Lines

Why a branch journal? Based on USAICS Regulation 310-5, the MI Branch journal exists to serve as a forum for progressive thought and the exchange of ideas of interest to the intelligence community. It is a place for hard-hitting, well-conceived, thoughtful analysis and observation using a conceptual approach. *The job of the MI Branch journal is not simply to describe but rather to analyze.*

Since intelligence is a multidisciplined field requiring an understanding of many related fields, the MI Branch journal can become one means of sharing expertise, raising practical questions, and creating the kind of informed awareness which prevents intelligence practitioners from succumbing to a familiar foe: tunnel vision.

Unlike a PAO publication, which exists principally to help foster good relations between units and organizations within the Army, and between the Army and the civilian world, a branch journal's main function is to promote professional dialogue. The roles of PAO publications and branch journals are complementary yet they remain distinct.

Unlike the descriptive approach of a PAO publication, articles conceived for the branch journal must go beyond description: the information presented must instead point to a concept which transcends the subject matter at hand, providing significant information which can be universally applied.

The format of *Military Intelligence* magazine allows for a combination of approaches which all add to our professional development. Feature articles furnish insight into current trends and thought. Letters to the editor raise questions and bring up new ideas and approaches, providing a valuable means of two-way communication. Book reviews help us evaluate the tools we need to sustain professional growth. And professional notes keep readers abreast of developments in the field of intelligence.

In essence, the MI Branch journal should be an overall reflection of the most salient concerns and overall intellectual direction of the Military Intelligence community. For this reason, themes must emerge from the contributors. And while a main feature topic might be represented on the cover of the magazine, it must not dominate the issue in such a way as to preclude the proper blend and balance of the branch journal. Each issue of the magazine should include something for everyone. And hopefully each reader will seriously consider giving something back to the entire intelligence community. As John Adams, our second president, once said: **"Let us . . . cherish, therefore, the means of knowledge. Let us dare to read, to think, speak and write . . . Let every sluice of knowledge be opened and set a-flowing."**

Stephen P. Aul

Editor

⟪ FEEDBACK ⟫

Editor:

I believe a few words are necessary concerning Maj. P.V. Huisking's article, "Afghanistan and The Soviet Press," in the January-March issue of Military Intelligence. First, a word of commendation to Maj. Huisking for his attempt to research Soviet writings on the subject. It is vital to examine what the Soviets themselves are saying, and to understand their views if we are to properly analyze their actions.

That being said, however, Maj. Huisking's article has a serious drawback. He has relied entirely on U.S. translations of Soviet articles, and on the badly slanted Soviet English language journal Soviet Military Review. While the value of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and Joint Publications Research Service translations is very high, they are inherently limited in that they cannot, and do not attempt to, translate everything in Russian on any subject. Further, the press of deadlines and the relative scarcity of technically qualified military translators means that some of the translations are unclear, or contain errors that mean they must be treated with caution. For the non-Russian speaker, of course, they are an indispensable tool, but their limitations must be recognized.

Given the sources available to him, it is not surprising that Maj. Huisking has reached the conclusions he has. An examination of the full range of Soviet publications, however, shows some shortcomings in those conclusions. First, while some Western commentators have stated the Soviets are writing little about Afghanistan, this is really not the case. For a period after the 1979 invasion, press coverage was sparse, but since at least December 1983, it has become extensive. Reports of individual and unit accomplishments, awards of various high decorations, idealized descriptions of conditions in Afghanistan, and attacks on Western support for Afghan rebels are frequent.

Similarly, the professional military journals have shown a sharp increase in both theoretical and practical writing on mountain combat, and the employment of various weapons systems in mountain conditions. Many of these articles have appeared in the journal Voennie Vestnik (Military Herald), which was apparently not included in Maj. Huisking's translations. This journal is intended for the mid-level commander, and is possibly the most important conduit for information to regimental level officers. In addi-

tion, many articles on the subject are, in typical Soviet fashion, somewhat veiled, and lack direct allusion to Afghanistan. This is particularly true when developments "from the foreign press" are discussed. This ploy, well known to Soviet officers, consists of taking some supposed piece from the Western press, which reflects on Soviet methods, and discussing it as if it were a totally non-Soviet matter. It avoids the prohibition on open writing on internally sensitive Soviet matters and still permits discussion of important subjects. Additionally, several Soviet books have recently been published on Afghanistan.

In summary, I must disagree with Maj. Huisking that the Soviets are not writing very much on Afghanistan. The amount of such coverage may have been small initially, but has grown greatly in the last three or four years. To a lesser extent, I must also disagree that there is little theoretical writing. Maj. Huisking's sources are the least theoretical Soviet military journals. Znamenosets and Komsomolskaya Pravda are aimed primarily at young, low level enlisted personnel, Krasnaya Zvezda at soldiers and company level officers, and Military Review mostly at Third World armed forces. Theoretical writings tend to be found in Voennie Vestnik, Til i Snabzheniye (Rear and Supply); Kommunist Vooryzhenikh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), which Maj. Huisking mentions but apparently did not use; and Voenno-Istoricheskil Zhurnal (Military Historical Journal), as well as a number of other periodicals. Additionally, much theorizing on the USSR goes on inside the various military academies, and the apparently superficial articles which appear in the press sometimes reflect the often lively debate on theoretical issues within the academies.

Having criticized Maj. Huisking's conclusions, I must again commend the attempt, which encountered difficulty mainly because of limitations in the sources Maj. Huisking was able to use. Perhaps the key point is the danger in the exclusive use of translations to support research on Soviet military thinking. Complete research can really be done only when all of the original sources can

be examined. This is one of the most telling arguments in favor of language training, and one which all MI officers should keep in mind.

Lt. Col. L. W. Denniston
HQ, Allied Forces Central
Europe

Editor:

Yet another nail has been pounded into the coffin lid of the MID(S) program!

Since publication of our article, "MID(S): Are We Destroying an Irreplaceable Asset?" a change to AR 140-192 now delegates command selection and tenure from FORSCOM to CONUSA level.

Unfortunately, this seems to be another step in the process of de-professionalization and degradation of the MID(S) program.

Are Army planners consciously dismantling the MID(S) program, or is this the unintended result of ignorance and neglect of this nation's desperate need for strategic intelligence?

Poor General Donovan must be doing somersaults in his grave.

Col. Robert J. Tata
Commander
466th MID(S)

Editor:

Greatly enjoyed reading "Terrorism in Insurgent Strategies" by 1st Lt. Kevin S. Rentner in the January-March 1985 Military Intelligence magazine. However, as a former "People's Warfare" instructor in a Communist cadre training school while engaged in a deep undercover assignment, I wish to point out a few errors in his otherwise excellent article.

First Rentner mentions, "To resist the Japanese and to eventually overthrow the Kuomintang, Mao created an organizational model whereby a complex party structure would control both insurgent mass organizations (front groups) and an armed element." The author has the sequence of order somewhat out of line.

As one of 12 founders of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Chairman Mao Tse-tung first employed active insurgency operations in 1926 during what the CPC terms as China's First Revolutionary Civil War, in which the CPC actively cooperated with the Kuomintang (KMT). Mao served as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's KMT Director of Agitation and Propaganda during Chiang's northern expedition. In this capacity, Mao wrote his first published work in March 1926, **Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,** and his second published work in March 1927, **Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan.**

Mao was in Hunan when Chiang launched his April 1927 pre-emptive attack against the CPC forces in Shanghai and when the CPC launched its 1 August 1927 uprising at Nanchang. Mao belatedly followed with his own peasant "Autumn Harvest Uprising" in September 1927. That period until July 7, 1937 was known by the CPC as China's Second Revolutionary War, a time when the CPC was pitted against the KMT and Mao's guerrilla strategy was fully evolved. Again from July 1937 until August 13, 1945, Mao's CPC claimed to have collaborated with Chiang's KMT in the Chinese war of resistance against Japan. Mao's CPC finally triumphed over Chiang's KMT on the Chinese mainland in China's Third Revolutionary Civil War period (as officially termed by the CPC) from August 1945 until October 1, 1949.

Mao's organizational model was based on his 1926 Hunan experiences and completed in 1929 at his Chingkang Mountain base area, wherein the CPC controlled the armed guerrillas and civilian mass organizations in a Communist insurgency aimed at overthrowing the KMT government.

Second, Rentner mentions, "He [Mao] envisioned three stages of protracted war directed by the party. The first, strategic defensive, would concentrate on building the organization, mobilizing support for the movement through the front organizations, and conducting only minor 'symbolic' military operations." This is not quite correct.

Mao did not quite "envision" his famed three-stage revolutionary war strategy. It was based on bitter battle experience from 1927 until 1936. Mao's doctrine is outlined in **Strategic Defense** which was written in December 1936 from his lectures at the Red Army College in

northern Shensi. Mao's strategic defensive called for all-out guerrilla warfare based on a tactical offensive and strategic defensive, in which dispersed guerrillas can be quickly assembled for concentrated annihilation attacks against an advancing enemy column entering the base area. While dispersed, guerrillas frequently engaged in "Sparrow Warfare," in which three-man guerrilla teams would harass the concentrated enemy or isolated enemy administrative posts— creating further dispersal of enemy forces.

It was during the strategic defensive phase that Mao's famous 16-character guerrilla formula was evolved: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy camps, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue." Mao was helped in evolving his guerrilla strategy by numerous specialists in the field, including General Lin Piao, who founded the concept of "Sparrow Warfare" and assisted in establishing the "Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,"and General Chu Teh, who served as military commander-in-chief from 1928 until 1954.

Third, Rentner mentions, "In the second phase, guerrilla war, the major goal is to control additional areas in order to further expand the political effort and strain the governments resources." This is true, except that guerrilla war is also fully waged in Mao's first phase as well. Also, when possible, area expansion is conducted not only during phase one but also before— during the organizational period when there is no enemy military resistance.

Rentner failed to mention that Mao's phase two is the strategic offensive phase of guerrilla warfare, in which guerrilla forces operate in battalion and regimental strength—rather than in fire team, squad, platoon and company-strength dispersed guerrilla units. Mao's three-phase revolutionary war strategy was not written as doctrine until May 1938 in his **Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan.** In this work, Mao fully outlines his second phase, "The Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War." This second phase is aimed at evolving into the third phase, mobile warfare—which is considered "conventional." But even with his third phase, Mao still recommended the employment of phase one or phase two guerrilla warfare as a supplement.

Fourth, Rentner stated that Mao's stra-

tegy suffered notable defeats in the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency, both in the 1950s. This statement is incorrect since Mao's three-phase evolutionary war strategy was used by neither the Huks nor the MRLA. The hard core of Mao's insurgent strategy is the creation of a self sufficient logistical base area. Neither Louis Taruc nor Chin Peng created a self-sufficient base area from which to launch a phase one or phase two guerrilla campaign.

Fifth, Rentner continues to state, "Although terrorism has been used by mass strategy insurgents, it plays a subordinate role to both the political and military objectives." In Mao's strategy, terrorism plays a vital role in mass organization and in the consolidation of a guerrilla base area.

The first written line of Mao's first published writing, **Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,** March 1926, asks this vital intelligence question—"Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?" In his second published writing, **Reports on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,** March 1927, Mao firmly endorses and encourages techniques of terrorism in dealing with his enemies by CPC-manipulated peasant associations—the mass organizations necessary to create guerrilla base areas. In March 1927, five months prior to his "Autumn Harvest Uprising," Mao advocated the following techniques in dealing with the class enemy: checking landlord accounts; levying contributions upon the landlord to the peasant association; minor protests against the landlord; major demonstrations against the landlord; "crowning" the landlords and parading them through the villages; locking up the landlords in the county jail; banishment; and execution.

After establishing his first guerrilla base area in the Chingkang Mountains, Mao used executions much more freely in 1928 and thereafter to eliminate a possible Fifth Column within his controlled or contested areas and to consolidate absolute CPC control. In the year following his 1949 conquest of the Chinese mainland, Mao had executed 1,500,000 "class enemies" by Mauser automatic pistols in staged mass "people's trials" to intimidate the populace through a strategy of terror.

This strategy of terror by Mao was

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Military Intelligence

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Book Review Policy

Book reviews are considered to be an integral part of the presentation of information of professional interest to the MI community. The normal policy of *Military Intelligence* is to publish reviews of books which have appeared in print over the previous year. Book reviews which are more than one year old are only published in cases where useful subject matter might not otherwise have been brought to the attention of our readers. Such reviews are considered on a case-by-case basis. Reviews of current books are more likely to be published. A limited number of books are received directly from publishers and are available for review. If you are interested in reviewing one of these books, please contact the editorial staff. Unsolicited reviews are also welcome and encouraged.

"Feedback" is the readers' column, *your* column. Letters printed in "Feedback" can be on any subject that relates to intelligence, electronic warfare, doctrine, tactics, innovations from the field, suggestions, criticism, even praise, or anything else the readers of *Military Intelligence* may find of interest. Letters *do not* have to refer to a previously printed article or letter from the magazine to be used in **FEEDBACK.**

Letter Policy: All letters to the editor must be signed. Names may be withheld if requested. Letters should be type-written and double spaced. The editor reserves the right to shorten letters. Letters are normally edited for style, grammar, spelling and punctuation. Please include a phone number (Autovon preferred) and a complete return address on the letter itself (envelopes tend to get separated from the letters).

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SUBJECTS: We are interested in all subjects relating to the diverse fields of military intelligence including Army doctrine and policies relating to intelligence; tactical and strategic intelligence; organization; weapons and equipment; foreign forces; electronic warfare; and intelligence collection (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, ect.). Historical articles should have contemporary value. If you have an idea for an article, contact us and explain your theme, scope and organization. It will save both of us time and will facilitate our planning.

STYLE: Military Intelligence prefers concise and direct wording in the active voice. Every article should have a beginning that catches the readers' attention, a body containing the crux of the article, and an ending which concludes or summarizes. Keep the article as simple as possible. Avoid unfamiliar terms, unexplained abbreviations, and poorly constructed sentences. Don't submit a manuscript unless you are completely satisfied with it. Read it over three or four times and then let a friend read it. It is not uncommon to revise an article several times before submitting a finished manuscript. Don't waste the readers' time with meaningless or repetitive phrases or words. We edit all articles. However, a polished article is more likely to be accepted than a hurried mistake-riddled effort. Save yourself time and effort; be your own editor. We do not normally allow writers to review how their articles have been edited.

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FORMAT: We prefer articles from 1,000 to 2,500 words in length. We will publish shorter or longer articles depending on quality. Develop your ideas and stop. Send clean, doublespaced manuscripts typed on one side of the sheet. Your name, length of manuscript, address, and phone number (Autovon preferred) should be typed on the first page. We prefer one original and one copy. Cite your references and enclose all quoted material in quotation marks. If possible, credit should be given within the article as footnotes are burdensome and use valuable space.

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GOD GRANT THAT MEN OF PRINCIPLE SHALL BE OUR PRINCIPAL MEN.

THOMAS JEFFERSON

SPECIAL TRUST

AND

CONFIDENCE:

THE DILEMMA OF LEADERSHIP

by Maj. J. F. Holden-Rhodes

"We face a dilemma that armies have always faced within a democratic society. The values necessary to defend that society are often at odds with the values of the society itself. To be an effective servant of the people the army must concentrate, not on the values of our liberal society, but on the hard values of the battlefield. We must recognize that this military community differs from the civilian community from which it springs. The civilian community exists to promote the quality of life; the military community exists to fight and, if need be, to die in defense of that quality of life. We must not apologize for these differences. The American people . . . are served by soldiers disciplined to obey the orders of their leaders and hardened and conditioned to survive the rigors of the battlefield. We do neither our soldiers nor the American people any favor if we ignore these realities."[1]
Gen. Walter Kerwin

"Two generations of American military officers brought up in the tradition of Robert Strange McNamara's business school ethic have unwittingly

fostered a persistent and insidious warp in the age-old fighting man's value system, a warp that may forever inhibit victory on the battlefield . . . ."[2]

Vice Adm. James Bond Stockdale

1985, The Year of Leadership

Leadership has been and will continue to be a primary object of discussion for military men as they seek to unravel its mysteries and understand its full implications. However, attempts to define the broad scope of leadership seem to fall short of the mark. The problem is that there are too many definitions, and when one tries to zero in on leadership in the military, the true meaning becomes even more elusive.

> **When one tries to zero in on leadership in the military, the true meaning becomes even more elusive.**

Since the earliest days of war, this thing called leadership has been wrapped in an almost ethereal cloak. Today, military leadership may still be found, but one must unravel a Gordian knot of sorts, if the essence of it is to be fully understood.

Ironically, if 1985 is the year of leadership, it is also the year of doubt. Since Army commanders have proclaimed that leadership be foremost in the thoughts and actions of Army personnel, they encourage a serious examination of military leadership by all concerned, especially those who are to be led.

Recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. John A. Wickham Jr., commissioned a survey which was completed by general officers of the Army. In March, a summary of the survey, curiously labeled "CLOSE HOLD" and "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY," was sent to all general officers.[3]

This is not the first survey conducted on leadership or ethics, nor will it be the last. In 1970, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army War College to undertake an analysis of the "moral and professional climate in the United States Army with a

particular view toward evolving solutions to correct this problem . . . I would like developed an officer's code which would serve as a kind of guide . . . ."[4] Adm. William Mack, former superintendent of the Naval Academy, called for a code of ethics for the military establishment around the same time. Again in 1977, the Army War College took on the topic of leadership and ethics. And, in 1978, the Air Force commissioned the Squadron Officers Study to look at the same issues.

While it is not the purpose of this paper to dissect the summary of the most recent survey, several key milestones are drawn from it. These points are used as stepping stones to direct questions toward the overall subject of military leadership.

"Operational skills," noted the survey, "are identified as the weakest area of preparation across all grades." Ominously, the statement that "Leadership skills are reported as the second greatest weakness in [professional officer] development," appeared directly thereafter in the text of the survey. And, while these two items are indeed worrisome, it is of the greatest importance to note that almost half of the general officers who responded to the survey believe that "senior Army leaders behave too much like corporate executives and not enough like warriors."[5]

It is to this last statement that investigation must be directed. For, if the accusation is true, then this shortcoming could well provide answers to the critical area of the lack of operational skills and also be important in determining the status of leadership in the Army.

In the history of the United States Army, two primary questions have been at the forefront: What kind of army will the nation have; and who shall command the army? While the latter issue appears to have been somewhat resolved (as well as it can be in a republic), the former has remained a point of contention since the time of Washington. A brief review of the question—what kind of army shall the country have—will set the stage for addressing the present day status of leadership.

George Washington offered comments which could be taken to support either a professional army or a citizen army. In the final analysis,

Washington appears to have been more inclined toward the professional army. Our history has been built upon the virtues of the citizen-soldier to such an extent that almost mythical qualities are attributed to this concept. History, on the other hand, also tells us that the Minutemen were not very good soldiers.

> **Our history has been built upon the virtues of the citizen-soldier to such an extent that almost mythical qualities are attributed to this concept.**

Nonetheless, the American Revolution left a dual legacy on this issue; in fact, from that time on, the battle lines were drawn between those who favored professional soldiers and those who argued that it was the citizen-soldier, alone, who should defend the republic.

The War of 1812, which in reality was the long overdue end of the American Revolution, did little to settle the issue. There were arguments drawn from a number of different battles during the war to support either side of the argument. It was not until shortly after the Civil War that the battle lines became more sharply defined. It was Emory Upton who wrote the case for a professional standing army. Deeply impressed by the German military system and its application to the American military establishment, he returned from a visit to the continent and Asia in 1876 to write two books, **The Armies of Asia and Europe**, and his magnum opus, **The Military Policy of the United States**. This last tome became one of the landmarks for American professional military thought.

John A. Logan, citizen, soldier, and a general of the Civil War, rebutted Upton's work with a strong argument for a citizen army. As the nineteenth century came to a close, the controversy continued unabated. Leonard Wood, citizen-soldier, also argued the case for a citizen army, while the national experience of the Spanish-American War appeared to suggest that some type of standing professional army was needed.

It was the German military, so admired by Upton, that set the scene for World War I. As the United States entered the war, the professionals were the ones who commanded the Army. Much to their chagrin, the force that they commanded was a citizen army.

Gen. John J. Pershing was greatly concerned with the lack of soldierly bearing in the U.S. Army as compared to that of the British and French. He, therefore, established a lengthy training program for his divisions before committing them to the front. While elements of the 1st Division arrived in France in July of 1917, Pershing had them broken down into battalions and regiments and then assigned them alongside French troops in quiet sectors. It was not until January of 1918 that the division was assigned its own sector at the front. By the summer and fall of 1918, Pershing's training program had broken down, thanks to the German offensive.

The remainder of the war was written in blood, as the American troops, citizen-soldiers, broke the deadlock. Casualties were high, much higher than would have been expected from regular troops. Nevertheless, the tide was turned.

At the very time World War I was at its height, plans were being drawn up back in Washington for the postwar Army. John McAuley Palmer, personally selected by Pershing, was assigned to the War Department to present Pershing's view on the subject. Palmer arrived to find that the Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, who had returned early from France, and thus had not had a chance to see the American Army reach maturity in battle, had already drawn up the postwar Army Plans. March had built a plan for an Uptonian expandable regular army with a peacetime strength of 428,000.

Palmer greatly upset March when, in a congressional hearing, he stated that the official Army bill was "not in harmony with the genius of American institutions." Palmer argued that the American military must grow out of the nation rather than requiring the nation to adjust to the military program: "The form of military institutions must be determined on political grounds, with due regard to the national genius and tradition."[6]

Following World War I, the National Defense Act was passed by Congress. The act authorized a peacetime regular army of 280,000 men with a wartime force to be built around the National Guard. Within several years, however, the Army was allowed to erode to a force of 125,000 men. The dichotomy was now institutionalized.

For the officer corps, the question of the kind of army drove another question even closer to home: What was the role of the officer corps in such an army? Fortunately, the ethic of duty, honor, and country was still the keystone of the officer corps between the world wars.

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With World War II looming large on the horizon, the vast size of the army that would be needed to win the war was obviously going to be unheralded in scope. In order to create the structure needed to accommodate such an undertaking, Gen. George C. Marshall, then Army Chief of Staff, turned to the only model available to him in the field of organization whose foundation was in keeping with American tradition—the business corporation.

In their book, **Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army**, Gabriel and Savage state that " . . . the individual military officer became identified with the corporate executive to the point where the functions of command were perceived as identical to the function of departmental management."[7]

By 1964, argue Gabriel and Savage, " . . . the American military structure had already become permeated by a set of values, practices, and policies that forced considerations of career advancement to figure more heavily in the behavior of individual officers than the traditional ethics normally associated with military life. In short, the Army as a whole and the officer corps in particular had already moved away from the traditional models and codes centered on 'gladiatorial' ethics."[8]

The loss in Vietnam was the first time that this country tasted the bitter pill of defeat. The U.S. government and its civilian leadership must accept primary blame for the loss, thanks to its failure to understand the nature of the war and to rally the country behind it. Nevertheless, if victory was to be the goal, the officer corps must also accept its share of the blame. It would appear that the "way of the soldier" and duty, honor, and country, had been replaced by a corporate ethos which in part held that in combat men could be managed to their deaths.

"Once the war began to wind down, however, there were some within the military who began to question what had happened. There was a small discernible movement, however tentative and timid, to cast a cold empirical eye upon the Army and to assess its operations under combat conditions. To be sure, the majority regarded such an examination as either dangerous or an exercise in self-flagellation, and certainly unnecessary. The majority comprised, and still does, those whose careers were deeply rooted in the policies and practices developed during the Vietnam years, and it was this group that finally prevailed. General William C. Westmoreland, the former commander of the U.S. Forces in Vietnam and later Chief of Staff of the Army, had ordered an empirical study to be conducted by the Army War College into the state of professionalism and leadership in the officer corps. When the study was completed in 1970, the results were so devastating to the image of the officer corps that Westmoreland initially ordered the study classified and limited its circulation to general officers."[9]

These postwar years reflected the crisis of a nation searching for its soul. It is traditional that following a defeat a nation and its military establishment go through a cleansing process. While the nation went through this self-examination, the Army did not. By suppressing the "Study on Professionalism," the report commissioned and then hidden away by Westmoreland in 1970, the opportunity for review and introspection was denied the Army, and with it the needed opportunity to search its own soul.

The advent of the All Volunteer Force raised again the question of what type of army the country would

have. Unfortunately, the Army, which should have questioned and protested this benighted concept, did not. In failing to do so, the Army had foisted upon it a political solution that did not represent either the "national genius" or the national "tradition" which John McAuley Palmer and others had recognized and courageously called for.

Having failed to cleanse its own ranks, and now saddled with an army that did not draw its members from a wide swath of the fabric of the nation, the officer corps was further isolated from the nation. From without, and within, the question of leadership in the Army sank further into doubt.

Gen. Douglas Kinnard, in his book, **The War Managers**, undertook a study of officers, mostly high ranking, who served in Vietnam and were responsible for executing questionable local policies. He reports that almost to a man these officers now have serious doubts, and even ethical misgivings, about the policies they were asked to carry out. Yet, not a single officer in this group either resigned or retired in protest; all carried out policies regardless of their personal feelings about them . . . . [10]

Between 1960 and 1980 only one United States flag officer resigned in public protest over questions of policy. During the same time period, 27 officers of flag rank in the Canadian forces resigned in protest over policy issues . . . . [11]

The Mayaguez Incident reflected all the worst that micromanagement means on the battlefield.

The period following Vietnam has seen the recurring manifestation of many of the things that led the country to defeat in Southeast Asia. The Mayaguez Incident reflected all the worst that micromanagement means on the battlefield. Direct lines of communication between the White House and the assault platoons on the beach reflected an overall military community that had failed in its duty to educate its civilian leaders as to how war is waged. The aborted rescue attempt of American citizens in Iran reflected

a national military organization that could not build a workable plan, although there were men, the same type of men who have worn the uniform since the first days of the republic, who would have walked where angels feared to tred—and done so successfully.

It was the rescue invasion of Grenada that, for the first time since Vietnam, raised the stock of the military. Ironically, it was a vestige of Vietnam, which surfaced during the aftermath of Grenada, that greatly tempered the newly-won support. An inordinate number of decorations were presented to the military force—more decorations than men involved. This incident raised the ugly spectre of a practice that had been one of the key indicators of the failure and decay of leadership in Vietnam.

In **Crisis in Command**, Gabriel and Savage point out that a study of the data concerning the number of types of medals awarded relative to both combat activities.and actual casualties taken suggests that as the frequency and intensity of enemy contact declined, the number of awards, many for bravery, actually increased at an astonishing rate. [12]

As a point of equal concern, the practice of award "packages" was instituted. Divided into three categories, certain prescribed decorations were issued for the combat sector, the service sector, and the support sector. The decoration for valor or exceptional service, that small piece of cloth and metal for which, suggested Napoleon, men would go to great lengths to earn, had been totally debased.

Today, the dilemma of leadership remains. That the present Chief of Staff of the Army had the courage to commission a survey to look into the condition of leadership within the Army is indeed a courageous move. What will be done with the results of that survey remains to be seen.

In his work, **Analysis of Political Behavior**, Harold Lasswell has described the primary work of those who take up the profession of arms as the management of violence. [13] Building upon a social science background, Lasswell and many others have attempted to ascribe to leadership the belief that it is a science, or nearly so. If, then, it is a science, there are certain immutable laws which apply.

Thus, through this line of thinking one might be able to "manage" leadership.

Gen. Sir John Hackett, writing in **The Profession of Arms**, suggests that Lasswell's definition is " . . . rather less precise." [14] Hackett states that, " . . . Service under arms has been seen at some times and in some places as a calling resembling that of the priesthood in its dedication. This view has never wholly disappeared . . . It has evolved into a profession, not only in the wider sense of what is professed, but in the narrower sense of an occupation with a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its own specific needs, a career structure of its own and a distinct place in the society which has brought it forth." [15]

Military leadership is an art form. While there are certain things which time and experience have shown to be elements of it, leadership in combat is as definable or undefinable as the stroke of an artist's brush. These tangible intangibles are the sum total of what we call leadership: the very stuff that enables one man to lead others into the valley of the shadow of death. While the trappings of management are an element of leadership, particularly in a technologically-oriented society, those things must be relegated to their proper place—tools which are used to prepare the things of war.

It was the Army's S.L.A. Marshall who gave us the essence of war through his seminal work, **Men Under Fire**. Simply put, it is the brotherhood of men, cemented by the glue of leadership, and tempered by hard realistic training that holds an army together under fire.

There is nothing in the American business ethic which deals with combat.

There is nothing in the American business ethic which deals with combat. A profit and loss statement has no bearing on battle. Attempts to quantify and qualify leadership in the ethic of the business world will always fall short of the mark. In war, one plus one frequently will not equal two. The shortcomings mentioned earlier from the survey—weakness in the area of operational skills, and the lack of leadership skills—are negative reflections of the managerial ethic.

"The introduction of systems analysis, cost effective criteria, and statistical measurement as overall tests of military value set in motion a process of erosion of the military ethic that seems almost inextricably tied up with successful management, company and personal profit, and rational self-interest. With these the military ethic is not at home. The soldier cannot adopt the methodology of business without adopting its language, its style, its tactics, and ultimately its ethics. Efficiency replaces honor as the greatest good. The military ethos should be one of duty, individual sacrifice, and group dedication. The traditional virtues of the military calling are loyalty, obedience, and courage. There may be lessons to be learned from the quarterly profit sheet of IBM or Textron, but these lessons should supplement, not submerge, military standards and values . . . ."[16]

The Center for Army Leadership, which was established at Fort Leavenworth in June of 1983, lists within its overall philosophy of leadership development nine skills which, it claims, leaders at all levels must have to be totally effective. These skills are:

- **Professional ethic**
- **Management technology**
- **Planning**
- **Decisionmaking**
- **Technical and tactical competencies**
- **Soldier team development**
- **Teaching and counseling**
- **Supervision**
- **Communication**[17]

Interestingly, management technology is listed above technical and tactical competencies. And, as if the lessons of **Men Under Fire** have been forgotten, soldier team development is placed well down the list.

The status of leadership in the Army of today is clearly in doubt. The question of how to rebuild remains to be answered. The starting point, however, is clearly marked. When an officer is commissioned he is given a piece of paper upon which he swears his oath of office. Within the text are several words which epitomize the essence of leadership: . . . reposing special trust and confidence in the fidelity and ability of . . . .

Until the officer corps wrests back its birthright—the privilege of leading men into battle, and the great responsibilities that go with that special trust, then there will be no confidence in its ability to lead, within the military establishment or outside of it. ★

FOOTNOTES:

1. Gen. Walter Kerwin, "The Values of Today's Army," **Soldier**, Sept. 1978, p.4.
2. Richard A. Gabriel, **To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier** (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), foreword.
3. Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Internal Surveys Suggest Serious Concerns About Army's Senior Leaders," **Armed Forces Journal International**, May 1985, p. 18.
4. Gabriel, p. 18.
5. Schemmer, p. 18.
6. Russell F. Weigley, **Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 231.
7. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, **Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army** (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978) p. 19.
8. Ibid., p. 17.
9. Ibid., p. 4.
10. Ibid., p. 67.
11. Ibid., p. 184.
12. Ibid., p. 14.
13. Harold D. Lasswell, **Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Approach** (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1966), p. 152.
14. Gen. Sir John Hackett, **The Profession of Arms** (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 9.
15. Ibid., p. 9.
16. Gabriel, foreword.
17. Maj. William R. Guthrie, "Be, Know, Do," **Commanders Call**, March-April 1985, pp. 16-17.

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Intelligence, Do

Josef Stalin and June 22, 1941

by Capt. Robert E. Kells Jr.

On June 22, 1941, the armed forces of Nazi Germany launched a surprise invasion of the Soviet Union, thus opening one of the largest and fiercest military campaigns in history. This event was an unmitigated disaster for the Soviets, one that nearly cost them their existence. The shock of the initial assault sent Red Army formations reeling and knocked Josef Stalin into a state of inaction for several days. Such was the thanks the Soviet leader received for placing his trust in Hitler's 1939 Non-Aggression Pact.[1]

The Soviet leadership was not, however, without warning of the impending Nazi attack. According to a number of sources, in the months preceding the German attack, the Soviet leadership disregarded an abundance of intelligence indicators.[2] Why did the leadership ignore the intelligence which pointed toward approaching disaster? Part of the answer lies in the very nature of Soviet military doctrine.

Soviet military doctrine has always placed great emphasis on continuous intelligence gathering and interpretation. Although Soviet doctrine seems objective in its approach to waging war, the subjective element plays a key role in interpreting intelligence. The subjective element refers mainly to an unquantifiable characteristic of warfare such as the personality of a military commander. A Soviet writer on military doctrine in the Stalinist period put it this way: "In time of war the subjective factor has great significance—the ability and know-how to lead, soberly to evaluate the situation, to utilize correctly potentialities, and to foresee the course of events."[3] These leadership qualities manifested themselves most prominently in the person of the *vozhd*, or supreme leader. Stalin was the second *vozhd* in the history of the Soviet Union, Lenin having been the first. The role of this individual in matters of both war and peace cannot be understated. "All knowledge, foresight, wisdom, and ability is said to exist in him . . . and, in fact, initiative is closely held at this level."[4] Good intelligence, therefore, is essential if the *vozhd* is to exercise his leadership successfully.

ctrine and Decisionmaking

Perhaps the most important facet of Soviet military leadership during Stalin's reign was the quest to foresee the course of events. Foresight and prediction are given very high priority in Soviet military doctrine and political thought, since both are deeply rooted in Marxist-Leninist theories of history and dialectical materialism. Prediction, in Soviet terminology, is based on "the calculation of the relation of forces existing and anticipated (on the basis of intelligence) to prevail."[5] Without knowledge of the enemy's situation, prediction of the course of events is impossible.

Soviet military literature is replete with examples which demonstrate the necessity of foresight in planning combat operations. Soviet offensive operations, for example, are conducted according to a rigid outline. "For this reason, it is imperative, within the limitations of each phase, to *foresee and clarify* the condition of the transition of consecutive phases . . . ."[6] The step by step procedure is contingent upon good intelligence, which the commander uses to make an estimate of the situation in order to proceed from one phase to the next at the proper time.

There are, however, two pitfalls in the Soviet approach to planning operations—chance (*sluchainost*) and provocation (*provokatsiia*). Both of these factors detract from the process of combat planning and execution. Chance is

impermissible in the Marxist-Leninist approach to war: first, because the nature of the objective approach to problems does not take chance into account; and second, because any chance occurrence betrays a failure to foresee the course of events and plan for any contingency. Provocation, on the other hand, is more feared than the element of chance. Raymond L. Garthoff illustrated this in his book **Soviet Military Doctrine**: "Unless the objective situation is carefully calculated and definite plans formulated and carried out to the very end, there is great danger that the enemy will subtly provoke one into unwittingly following a course of action favoring his side of the equation of the relation of forces."[7] The loss of initiative to the enemy or a departure from the plan of action could result in disaster, according to Soviet doctrine, since one would no longer be in control of the course of events. From a doctrinal standpoint, then, the Soviet system imposes a distinct rigidity which is subject to the vagaries of the *vozhd*.

Another part of the explanation can be traced to Stalin's refusal to believe the intelligence information which was being provided by the various intelligence organs.

During the decade preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, the intelligence department took on the title of Main Intelligence Administration, or GRU

(*Glavnoye Razvedovatenoye Upravleniye*), and competed with two other services for prominence in gathering intelligence on foreign countries. The diplomatic corps of the Soviet Union, one of the GRU's rivals, was effective to a point. However, it remained handicapped throughout the 1930s because of its official nature. The GRU's only serious competition in intelligence gathering came from the OGPU, the Soviet Secret Police Agency. The political power play between the GRU and OGPU ended abruptly with the Great Purge trials of 1937-38, which decimated the ranks of both organizations. As the GRU recovered, it gradually dominated the field of foreign intelligence collection. By 1941 the organization had re-established a certain degree of proficiency in intelligence gathering and began to supply the Soviet Union with much needed information on German activities throughout Europe.[8]

During several years following the purge, the intelligence services had recovered; and, as a number of authors point out, the surprise attack on the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany in 1941 was not due to the Soviet leadership's lack of intelligence concerning Adolf Hitler's intentions. Seweryn Bialer, the editor of **Stalin and His Generals**, described the surprise attack in this way: "Unique was the disparity between the availability of abundant intelligence information, of warnings from friends, neutrals, and even foes and the stubborn refusal of a leadership which boasted of its hard headedness to face the facts."[9]

Bialer's contention that a great deal of intelligence relating to Hitler's intentions in the summer of 1941 was available to the Soviet leadership is also supported by the testimony of various participants in the Great Patriotic War. Since the publication of memoirs by prominent Soviet figures from this time period, most historians have concluded that Stalin knew war with Germany was inevitable and that only the exact date of the invasion was unknown.[10] Others, especially Soviet historians writing during the de-Stalinization period, put the blame for the surprise attack entirely on Stalin's shoulders, claiming that he had been fooled by Hitler and ignored the intelligence warnings because of his faith in the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939.

Stalin certainly was not a naive man, and he could not have helped being aware of the massive German troop buildup on the borders of the Soviet Union because his intelligence services were doing an admirable job collecting information. The problem, according to Barton Whaley, author of **Code Word: BARBAROSSA**, was in Stalin's interpretation of the incoming data. Whaley outlines five possible hypotheses regarding German intentions toward the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. It is his belief that Stalin was purposely led to believe that any Nazi aggression against Russia would be preceded by an ultimatum, in which case the Red Army could have been alerted and, at the very least, could have slowed down the German advances of the first few days. "He [Stalin] thought only to buy peace until the next year, when the Red Army would have rebuilt to the unassailable state from which he himself had reduced it by the Great Purge."[11]

Stalin finally became convinced that an attack against his country was in the offing on the afternoon of June 21, yet he waited until three hours before the attack to issue an alert. This refusal to act any earlier underscores Stalin's desire to delay the war until 1942.

On the foreign affairs front, Stalin's intelligence organizations were the *eyes* of the Soviet Union—they did not fail him. The failure in June of 1941 was a planning breakdown on Stalin's part. This was due in large measure to the manner in which the Soviet leader received intelligence from the various collection agencies.

Four different agencies delivered information to Josef Stalin regarding the intentions of Nazi Germany toward the Soviet Union. The GRU operated under the Army General Staff, but its head, General F. I. Golikov, reported directly to Stalin rather than to the Chief of Staff. The *Rote Kapelle*, the Soviet Union's spy network, functioned under the direction of Golikov and relayed reliable information about the date of Barbarossa to the GRU. Included in this spy network were Russia's most famous and dependable agents, such as Rudolph Rossler (code named Lucy) and Richard Sorge, the GRU agent in Japan. The Main Intelligence Directorate also collected data from international sources, such as the foreign press, public opinion commentaries, and the military, political, and technical writings out of Germany and other countries.[12]

Stalin's second source of intelligence was Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, the People's Commissar of the Navy. Originally, the Navy had come under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Defense, but the two were separated in 1938. Thus, from 1938 on, Naval Intelligence was an independent agency responsible to Admiral Kuznetsov.

The People's Commissariat for State Affairs (NKVD) was a third source of information for Stalin. This organization, headed up by L. P. Beria since 1938, was the official organ for internal affairs, answerable to the government. Much of the information coming to Stalin from this source concerned border clashes and reports of German agents who crossed the border into Russia. The NKVD's data were thus limited to internal state security.

The last source of intelligence available to Stalin was the diplomatic service, or Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Through this agency, Soviet ambassadors reported the warnings of both West European and East Asian nations. The key figure in this agency was the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, whom Barton Whaley described as "the general manager of the machinery of Soviet diplomacy and senior messenger boy."

All of the aforementioned figures reported directly to Stalin. Although intelligence briefs outlining their own interpretations of the intelligence were prepared for Stalin, especially by Golikov and Kuznetsov, Stalin, nonetheless, insisted on seeing the original reports and ignored or discounted the opinions of his cohorts in interpreting the data. And when they dared to express an opinion about incoming data, Stalin railed at his intelligence chiefs: "Don't tell me what you think," screamed Stalin on one occasion, "give me the facts and the source!" Stalin, in short, was his own intelligence chief.[13]

While Soviet historians of the de-Stalinization period blamed Stalin for the failure to heed the obvious warnings of the impending German attack, in more recent years, the responsibility for the disaster of June 22, 1941, has been broadened to include the heads of agencies that provided Stalin with intelligence. This movement in Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War became evident at a meeting of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in 1966. The discussion at the meeting centered on a recently pub-

lished book by Soviet historian Alexander Nekrich entitled **June 22, 1941**, in which the author ascribed responsibility for the disaster of that day solely to Comrade Stalin. Unfortunately for Comrade Nekrich, the times had changed and his thesis became a controversial subject.

In a closed meeting of the Division of History of the Great Patriotic War, several Soviet historians discussed the Nekrich book and, in the process of criticizing his work, revealed some valuable information about the manner in which intelligence was presented to Stalin. General Golikov, head of the GRU, received much criticism for structuring intelligence reports to favor Stalin's own theory on German actions in Europe. Professor G. A. Deborin, in describing Golikov's reports, observed: "They were always in two parts: in the first part he reported information which he classified as *from reliable sources*; here, for example, he included everything that supported the forecast of Germany's invading Great Britain. In the second part of his communications he reported information *from doubtful sources*: for example, information from the spy Richard Sorge about the date on which Germany would attack the USSR."[14] Professor Deborin concluded that Golikov had lied to the government by constructing intelligence reports to ingratiate himself with Stalin.

The memoirs of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov accuse both Golikov and Admiral Kuznetsov of submitting to Stalin's views on war with Germany. Zhukov cited a document from Kuznetsov which reported that a German invasion of the Soviet Union would commence on May 14, 1941. Kuznetsov's conclusion, according to Zhukov, dismissed the information: "I consider that this information is false and was specially sent through this channel so that it would get to our government and the Germans could see how the USSR would react."[15] The information, in this case, was false. On June 1, 1941, Kuznetsov forwarded another report naming the period of June 20-22 as the date for the invasion. Kuznetsov followed this up by checking to see if the report had reached Stalin; whether the admiral believed this particular bit of intelligence to be reliable is unknown.[16]

In the process of indicting members of the personality cult that surrounded Stalin in 1941, conflicting versions of the roles played by certain individuals have surfaced. The most notable example of this is one account by Soviet historians which accuses Admiral Kuznetsov of being just as guilty of playing up to Stalin as were Golikov and Zhdanov, a close friend of the Soviet leader. The facts would seem to prove otherwise. Kuznetsov had the Soviet navy placed in a high state of readiness several days before the invasion.[17] A few phone calls by Kuznetsov and his staff on the eve of the invasion gave the Soviet navy, most notably the Black Sea fleet, an edge over the border military districts, most of which received the invasion warning too late. And Kuznetsov's own writings portray him as a vigilant naval officer rather than a co-conspirator in the personality cult of Stalin.

What emerges from this brief examination of the Soviet intelligence services prior to the German invasion is a picture of good intelligence being put to no use whatsoever. Why, then, did Stalin and many of his aides insist that the reports were unfounded when everything pointed to war in 1941? The actions of the men surrounding the *vozhd* can probably be attributed to fear of the man for whom they worked. Alexander Orlov, a member of Stalin's inner circle in the 1930s, cited the case of a deputy chief of intelligence by the name of Artouzov who gave Stalin the *wrong* answer to an intelligence report regarding Poland's role in a future European war. The year was 1936. One year later, Artouzov was dead, a victim of Stalin's purges.[18] In order to keep their jobs (and their heads) men such as Golikov and Zhdanov followed the party line—a line drawn by Josef Stalin.

A second factor that affected both Stalin and his lieutenants was the intelligence itself. The German intelligence service, the *Abwehr*, set out in early 1941 to convince the Russians that the German troop buildup in the east was meant as a cover for an amphibious operation against Great Britain. This was believed by Golikov, Zhdanov, and probably Stalin, at least for awhile. Zhdanov reflected another widely held belief when he told Admiral Kuznetsov that Germany could not invade Russia in 1941 without violating a strategic maxim laid down before the First World War: "He [Zhdanov] told Admiral Kuznetsov that month [February 1941] that he believed Germany incapable of fighting on two fronts and, therefore, thought an attack improbable. He interpreted the German violations of Soviet air space and military buildup on the Soviet border to be mere precautionary measures on Hitler's part, or, at most, a means of putting psychological pressure on the Soviet Union."[19] British and American warnings of an impending invasion were dismissed by Stalin as provocations by Western imperialists who wanted the USSR involved in the war to take pressure off the United Kingdom.

Conclusion

In terms of Soviet military doctrine, Stalin's actions prior to June 22, 1941, seemed perfectly reasonable. Stalin had come to the conclusion, probably early in 1941, that war with Germany was inevitable. This is confirmed by Admiral Kuznetsov in his memoirs: "He [Stalin] viewed the 1939 treaty as only a means of buying time, but the reprieve turned out to have been considerably shorter than he had reckoned. His mistake, in my opinion, was an incorrect estimate of when the conflict would take place . . . . "[20] Barton Whaley came to the conclusion, stated previously, that Stalin believed an ultimatum would precede a declaration of war by Germany. This assessment is based on misinformation produced by German intelligence and confirmed by other nations (including Great Britain) which also picked up the false German intelligence signals.

Stalin's assessment of the strategic situation between his country and Germany led him to the erroneous conclusion that there would be no war in 1941. The Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 purchased time for the Red Army to re-equip and train for possible combat operations in 1942.[21] At the very least, Stalin would have been able to negotiate from a position of greater strength once his army had completed modernization. Until that time, however, the cardinal rule of Soviet military planning was observed: "Never provoke an enemy and never be provoked by him. To do otherwise means that the good communist has abdicated control over the thrust of history and handed the initiative to hostile forces."[22]

The fear of provocation explains both Stalin's disbelief of West European warnings about Hitler's intentions and his refusal to alert the Red Army in the border military districts. A response to provocations, either direct or indirect, might have provided Hitler with an excuse for war. As a result, outrageous incidents occurred, such as allowing German reconnaissance aircraft forced down in the Soviet Union to take off with their cameras full of exposed film.[23] The plan, however, could not be violated until the *vozhd* signaled a move to the next stage of operations.

Stalin kept to his own limited vision of events in 1941. The failures of that year were Stalin's, not failures of intelligence collection. Stalin's incompetency as *vozhd* in the case of the German invasion arose from what one might term wishful thinking and his inability to foresee the course of events. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii commented on the shortcomings of the prewar period in his book **Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine, and Concepts**: "As a result of the errors committed by our supreme command before the war, there were no directives to mobilize the frontier forces or to advance and deploy covering armies along the planned defense lines."[24] Instead, prewar plans to contain enemy penetrations of border regions and to drive them back into Poland were put into motion. This action, taken on the morning of June 22, 1941, reflected the failure of the history-conscious Soviet Union to take into account lessons from recent events in Poland and France regarding the nature of a German attack.[25]

Stalin's shortcomings in the debacle of June 1941 were deeply rooted in his failure to properly foresee the course of events and to take appropriate countermeasures. German misinformation was partially responsible for this since it led Stalin to expect an ultimatum prior to Hitler's attack.

Fear of provocation from the enemy and repression of dissenting views among his advisors are two faults directly attributable to Stalin; they reflect what Soviet military writers refer to as "inflexibility in leadership." This inflexibility was Stalin's, but it is indicative of a human element which Soviet military doctrine cannot escape. Even with its attempt to quantify all of the variables of modern war, the Soviet system must still rely on chance, so to speak, in the predictive and subjective abilities of the *vozhd*. In 1941 Josef Stalin demonstrated that Soviet military science, in spite of good intelligence, could not be applied as an entirely objective approach to war.

The methods of presenting intelligence to the supreme leader point up another difficulty faced by functionaries within a bureaucracy—the political nature of the intelligence field. Presenting intelligence in itself is a political act which can make or break careers. The men surrounding Stalin knew the consequences of presenting conclusions which ran counter to Stalin's own. If the politics of survival dictated the format by which information was presented to Stalin, it seems that the efforts of all the Soviet agents operating throughout the world were for naught. In Stalin's intelligence agency, as in many others, the political context framed the presentation. The result, in retrospect, was disastrous.

Intelligence played a vital role in the quest for national security in Stalin's time and it continues to do so today. Though the doctrine itself may have been sound, it was still subject to unquantifiable variables such as the lead-er's personality and the behavior of bureaucracies. In this age of information, when intelligence services East and West possess a panoply of intelligence collection means, we ought not to confine ourselves strictly to the study of doctrines, but examine some of the intangibles as well. ★

Footnotes
1. John G. Stoessinger, **Why Nations Go to War** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 33-67.
2. See especially Barton Whaley, **Code Word: BARBAROSSA** (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1973).
3. Raymond L. Garthoff, **Soviet Military Doctrine** (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), p. 201.
4. Ibid., p. 199.
5. Ibid., p. 255.
6. Ibid. (Emphasis mine) Another example of intelligence and foresight in Soviet combat planning is taken from a manual entitled **General Tactics**: "The organization of combat operations is not only based on intelligence prior to the operation, but also on foresight in predicting the course of developments during the battle. This foresight, in turn, must be established on an analysis of the capabilities of our own forces and probable enemy countermeasures."
7. Ibid., p. 257.
8. John Erickson, **The Soviet High Command** (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1962), p. 357.
9. Seweryn Bialer, ed., **Stalin and His Generals** (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 179.
10. Whaley, p. 226.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 194.
13. Alexander Orlov, **Handbook for Spies and Guerrilla Warfare** (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1972), p. 10.
14. Vladimir Petrov, ed., **June 22, 1941: Soviet Historians and the German Invasion** (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 250.
15. Marshal G. K. Zhukov, **The Memoirs** (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), p. 229.
16. Reuben Ainsztein, "Stalin and June 22, 1941: Some New Soviet Views," **International Affairs** (London), 42, October 1966, p. 669.
17. Bialer, p. 193.
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19. Whaley, p. 198.
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21. Alexander Werth, **Russia at War, 1941-1945** (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1964), p. 120.
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24. V. D. Sokolovskii, **Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and Concepts**, Translated by Translation Services Branch, Foreign Technology Division, Wright Patterson AFB (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 147.
25. Werth, p. 133.

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LEADERSHIP

—————— IN RETROSPECT

by Lt. Col. Thomas W. O'Connell

Leadership . . . easy enough to define, tough to execute, and critical to combat readiness in tactical MI units. When we pause to reflect on our individual leadership styles, we probably can identify a wide range of personal and professional attributes which blend together to direct the manner in which we discharge our responsibilities. The influence we exert as leaders is perhaps not fully appreciated until a key leadership position is relinquished. Reflection then alters our perspective and the luxury of hindsight can generate introspective assessments which can make us wish we had that precious time back to try it all over again.

After all, there is certainly a tremendous wealth of resource material on this vital subject. Review of some of these references *after* turning over a key leadership position can be a humbling and intimidating experience. Each page can slice through smugness and self satisfaction, and cause the onset of some uncomfortable squirming, as we instinctively contrast examples given in references against our attempts at leading others.

I'm sure that my own personal leadership style is not the product of any magical or special process. In fact, it probably puzzles as many as it might ever inspire. Yet, like many others, I've been lectured on it, been on the giving and receiving end, and watched it go on all around me for a few years now. However, I had never been asked to write about it until I received a call from an old "friend" at the Intelligence Center and School. The guidance was broad . . . just write on "leadership." My polite protests were met with the reply that Major General Weinstein thought it would be a good idea. Out came the leadership books.

As I scratched out a rough outline, I often thought about what former subordinates might think of each point. I guess there might be a few who will read this article and ask why O'Connell didn't do it that way when he was their leader. Good point. Sitting down *before* assuming a leadership position and promising to follow all leadership principles to the letter are probably admirable endeavors. All the ingredients necessary to follow a particular leadership recipe are present (to some degree): a mission to accomplish, a calendar of events, equipment, financial resources, an organizational structure, and eager subordinates. However, all the good intentions generated by this process have a tendency to come unglued when the crush of actual responsibility is applied.

I had the extreme good fortune of recently commanding a divisional MI battalion (CEWI). If I could start all over again, I know I would certainly change many of the decisions I made. In retrospect, I now know I could have been a more effective leader and commander if I had devoted more time and attention to certain areas, less to others, and ignored a few. Once the clock starts ticking, how-

ever, we quickly find that there are no halftimes or time-outs. We train hard, maintain hard, lead and care to the best of our ability. The clock only stops when the boss tells us to go fight somebody. We are then in overtime (of the worst type). Since the typical divisional MI battalion will be spread throughout the entire area of operations, the MI commander faces a leadership challenge far different from a combat arms commander who is normally concerned with maneuvering a battalion-sized unit over a smaller geographical area. Although command must be exercised, control is an entirely different issue. The leadership exercised before a conflict might very well be as critical as that which takes place during hostilities.

Let me take this luxury of retrospect and assume I could do it all again. What would I change? How would I focus on those leadership issues which will *truly* make a difference relative to the combat readiness of my command? Before I turn the clock back two years, let me make a broad statement on what environment tactical MI commanders and leaders face today.

I know of no other combat support organizations as complex as tactical MI units. The wide range of mission requirements, broad diversity of individual skills, rapid organizational and doctrinal evolution, and overall technical complexity combine to make the successful execution of leadership absolutely critical to combat readiness. Those of us who have served at the division or corps level in tactical MI units will instantly recognize this statement as fact. (If you don't, you were probably SD to the post swimming pool during your assignment.)

OK, so I know my job will be tough and complex. Here is the advice I'd give myself if I had to do it all over again. (Please remember that some of these points will naturally reflect my own assessments of what I didn't do so well and will also include perceptions of the type of command climate I served in.) In my case, I perceived the climate to be superb. My leaders generally told me what they wanted, provided the personnel and resources, gave encouragement and training, and were dead serious about combat readiness. They truly cared

for the welfare of their subordinates. They were able to give me a pat on the back when it was deserved or a kick two feet lower when that approach was needed.

DOs

• Review and study the excellent range of written leadership material available through the Army-wide Training and Doctrinal Literature Program (ATDLP). Read FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, and FM 100-1, *The Army*. Focus on the ethics portions of these manuals. Study AR 600-50, AR 600-20, and FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*. They are critical elements to understanding leadership requirements. In order to make the tough choices, a leader requires a strong ethical foundation. Whether an individual holds a commission or not, **The Armed Forces Officer**, published by the Department of Defense (DOD), makes excellent leadership reading. General A. S. Newman's column in **Army** magazine contains as much common sense on leadership as can be found anywhere. Better still, take the time to read General Newman's superb work on the human element in leadership, **Follow Me**, published in 1981.

• Talk in depth with those who have gone before you. What did they do well? Why? What was effective? What would have prevented them from executing their mission in combat? Once you identify those issues which are absolutely critical to combat readiness, strive to become as obnoxious and overbearing as possible while you tackle those items.

• Fight to become as technically proficient as possible. Let your subordinates know where your limitations are most serious and where you most need their help. Make sure they have every opportunity to develop their technical proficiency. Strive to identify those who are true technical experts. Doctrine must become second nature. You may not agree with all the published doctrine, but you have no business criticizing it if you don't know what it says. The 34 series field manuals have great potential as MI leadership tools.

• Review what guidance your higher headquarters and superiors have issued. (Total familiarity with your division's 350-1 regulation is necessary.) You'll find that you can't do it all. Everything can't have the top priority. Eliminate those things that don't contribute to combat readiness. One commander I worked for handed out a small booklet which outlined his command philosophy and explained what standards he expected. I read that short document at least once a month in command. It never failed to answer a tough question. All the answers were there. A subsequent commander gave all his subordinate commanders four simple maxims. He asked us to keep them foremost in our minds. Again, they were valuable in approaching a problem which would involve the CG. All subordinates had the same guidance. Consistency was present. Translate and refine this guidance for *your* subordinates.

• History is important. Review reports such as IG findings, disciplinary files, after-action reports from exercises and call-outs, drug and alcohol reports, letters of indebtedness, etc. Know what your unit has done well and where it needs help. Many problems you face will have a long history. Many will directly affect combat readiness. This perspective will give you a foundation upon which to build.

• List those critical items that *you* will emphasize. Start with combat readiness and brief *every* new trooper on your policies. Rank is immaterial. Captains, warrant officers and sergeants should hear firsthand what you are telling new privates and other replacements. They need to hear from your mouth exactly what your guidance is on safety matters and exactly how you will deal with drug offenses. Encourage the pursuit of excellence in training and maintenance. Encourage initiative. At the end of that session, there should be no question about the commander's policies, his goals, and general outlook on his command. Make sure they all know you expect the chain of command to be used, but that *your door is open.*

- Carefully assess the tenor in which rewards and punishment are handled. (Remember that it can take months for the award of a DA Certificate or an Army Commendation Medal to take place, whereas Article 15s tend to smoke through the system.) A subordinate leader who is quick with the punishment and slow with the rewards can totally throw off track your attempts to balance these elements across your command.

- Remember that no matter how busy you are, your subordinates will teach you something very valuable each day *if* you take the time to learn. Close interaction with them will invariably give you an insight into their needs. Moreover, a heart-to-heart with a concerned subordinate can tell you what's going well and what's not going well.

- Ask yourself the tough questions . . . the ones you might not *really* want answers to. Could we really execute this mission under hostile conditions? Do my communications systems really work? Have we really spent quality time on maintenance? Have I given them enough rest . . . or do I need to push harder? Have I eliminated distractions which are under my control . . . or am *I* creating many of these distractions?

- Look two years beyond the anticipated end of your tour with that unit. Have you really thought about what tough decisions are needed for the future? Will your existing equipment be capable of accomplishing the mission? Will your organizational structure support the intelligence cycle and provide critical intelligence under the most adverse conditions? Have you honestly done your share to interact with the schoolhouse, voicing your concerns and ideas? Have you taken the lead to ensure that those combat arms commanders who will lead tomorrow's Army really understand the capabilities and limitations of your unit so they will be in a position to help our branch accomplish the mission? Your whole thrust in successfully completing a command tour or key leadership assignment cannot be solely oriented toward completing that particular assignment.

Use the talent within your unit to build for the future. (Some months ago, the Intelligence Center and School published a document called *Evolution of Military Intelligence 1944-1984*. Although this effort was primarily historical, it formed an excellent basis for a review of what gyrations the MI force structure had been through—and why. I considered this effort to be a sound example of leadership initiative. Our young developing leaders now have an accurate reference which will allow them to exercise leadership in this critical area.)

DON'Ts

I only have one "Don't" to tell myself. Don't ever underestimate the potential valor, dedication, initiative, and professionalism of your troopers to perform and execute in a hostile environment.

I had the opportunity to share experiences with many of my subordinates during Operation Urgent Fury. That action was certainly not a major conflict and I don't want to launch into a discourse on who actually did what, or how the intelligence system worked from the national level to the squad level, or to critique the performance of MI units who participated in that operation. From the time of alert notification to actual load out and deployment, and throughout the period of hostilities, I witnessed the following:

- A total willingness to immediately deploy and fight. Leaders at the captain, lieutenant, warrant officer, and NCO levels displayed superb initiative in the absence of specific orders.

- A very high level of physical fitness.

- A true concern for the state of maintenance of all equipment—aircraft, radars, RATT rigs, sensors, intercept equipment, and small arms.

- Enlisted troopers and officers alike who gave 110 percent to accomplishing the mission, despite physical danger and fatigue.

- True concern on the part of junior leaders for the welfare of their subordinates. This sense of caring extended all the way back to Fort Bragg where the rear detachment did an exceptionally outstanding job for families of deployed troopers.

A leader can't make all of the above happen after the order to deploy is given. The necessary ingredients must be there before you go. I was very fortunate to have outstanding leaders and troopers under my command. I didn't do it for them, they did it themselves. I'd like to think part of the reason is that I didn't underestimate any leader's most precious and critical resource—the individual trooper.

Military Intelligence is facing leadership challenges today which will shape the future of our branch for many decades to come. Meeting these challenges will take every scrap of leadership skill we can muster. From what I've seen, our chances are good. But let's not leave it to chance. MI Branch has some of the brightest and toughest young talent in our Army today. Leadership development takes hard work; but when you take time to reflect on the last leadership position you held, all that hard work will have paid off. Hopefully, your period of leadership (in retrospect) will be a great reward for your honest efforts. ★

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If I were a lieutenant today in the 101st Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI)

I WOULD

work hard to

"LEAD BY EXAMPLE!"

Lt. Col. James R. Riser

WITH REGARD TO MY ARMY AND PROFESSIONALISM

I WOULD feel personally honored to serve my country as an officer in the United States Army.

I WOULD always remember that my mission is to provide intelligence support to the 1st Infantry Division. I would make sure that my troops know the critical importance of their contributions to the division's combat readiness and that they are physically and mentally prepared to go to war at any time.

I WOULD know the doctrine prescribing how intelligence "works" within a division. (Get copies of, and read, FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*; FM 34-80, *Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*; and FM 34-103, *Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*.)

I WOULD spend a part of each day studying some aspect of the proud institution in which I serve, the United States Army. (Read some history about our country and our army at war. It will give you some perspective on why intelligence and unit readiness are so vital. Start with *The Leavenworth Papers* from the Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College: Number 3. *Not War, But Like War: The American*

Intervention in Lebanon and Number 5. *Fighting the Russians in Winter*. Additionally, S.L.A. Marshall's books are super. Try *Battles in the Monsoons* to get an accurate picture of combat in Vietnam.)

I WOULD get my own personal copy of FM 27-1, *Legal Guide for Commanders*, and study up on the administration of military justice and administrative law at the company level. Also study, and get for each of your soldiers, FM 27-14, *Legal Guide for the Soldier*.

I WOULD acknowledge that senior officers and many NCOs have already experienced many of my problems, so I would seek their advice and help. (Make sure, however, their advice and help is based on a correct understanding of *your* particular problem.)

I would inspect myself thoroughly and frequently:

• Do I need a haircut? (Lieutenants should get haircuts before they need them—it helps in making captain.) If I wear a mustache, is it properly trimmed?

• Are my boot heels run down? (Good lieutenants and lieutenant colonels should wear out lots of boot heels. We need to replace them often.)

Does my uniform fit? Buttons, nametags, patches okay? Hatbill clean? Field gear—would I be in uniform if I went to the field today? Overweight? Out of shape?

• How is my military bearing—do I stand up straight? How do I "shape up" as an officer? Good? Not so good? (Remember: Your troops are inspecting you whenever you are in their presence. You are expected to and must set the example. You can start with AR 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*. Also be aware of and comply with appropriate command policy letters.)

I WOULD establish and maintain an open line of communication to my company first sergeant and my battalion command sergeant major. (These professional soldiers can take a lot of misery out of your life if you will let them.) I would not take myself *too* seriously nor get bogged down with worry. (No one will shoot you if you display a fleeting imperfection once in awhile.) I would have a pen or pencil and a notepad with me at all times and I'd develop a habit of writing notes to myself. I would write down good ideas as I thought of them or when someone else mentioned one. (Then you should use all the good ideas you have notes on, if you can. It

also helps to jot down bad habits you might need to work on.)

I WOULD assemble my own up-to-date working tools for immediate use: ARs, FMs, SOPs, DA pamphlets, checklists, policy letters, and soldier's manuals. (Also get copies of IG and Command Inspection reports to see if your areas of responsibility passed or flunked—good place to start work. Also get appropriate policy letters published by higher headquarters—at least to division level. You can tell which ones you need by reviewing lists of published letters. Your company commander and battalion adjutant can help you on this one. Also, frequently review DA Pam 310-1, *The Consolidated Index to Publications and Forms*, to see if a new publication or change is available to help you in your work.)

I WOULD strive to become technically proficient in my principal and additional duties. I would, in addition to my principal duty, organize each of my additional duties with a mini-chain of command to ensure that each duty is, in fact, fully carried out. (Know the purpose of each additional duty and who or what the target is. Check feedback to see if your additional duty is on target.) I would coordinate with battalion staff officers having functional responsibility for my principal and additional duties to make sure I am meeting their requirements and expectations. I would also get with the IG inspector for each of my duties for guidance, direction, sympathy, or whatever help I may need. At the very least, I would get the list of references (to include dates of publication) used to inspect each area. (This works well for all duties, and it helps to show your commander that you've got it together and are professional.)

I WOULD not "look the other way" if I saw a uniformed soldier improperly dressed, sloppy, or who didn't salute. I'd correct him on the spot and report it to his commander if appropriate. Never pass by a mistake! I would require all subordinates to practice good military courtesy in my presence (for example, "Yes, Sir" or "No, Sir," proper responses to my questions, standing up when addressed by me, and so forth). I would not allow junior soldiers of any rank to call me by my first name or nick-name. I would insist on military courtesy. (And don't address your subordinates or superiors by their first names. Use correct military titles in your professional dealing with others.)

I WOULD position myself to the left of any senior officer with whom I might be walking and I would require subordinates walking with me to do the same. (This is an old Army custom. Do your part to keep military traditions and customs alive in our Army.) I would return subordinates' salutes with a cheerful and hearty verbal greeting as well as a snappy return salute. (Remember, your soldiers expect you to speak when meeting them and how you speak is their clue to your attitude.)

I WOULD make sure that my word is my bond. I would take pride in having a reputation for truthfulness and honor that would allow my troops to say, "It has to be true, Lieutenant . . . said so." (Follow through with anything you tell your troops you will do and ensure feedback gets to them. Your credibility is in jeopardy if you don't.)

I WOULD be "up front" with my evaluations of subordinates. Don't "lay back" and let your subordinates think they are doing just fine and then destroy them with poor OERs or EERs. You must develop the courage to constructively inform others of their shortcomings. Do this in a timely manner so your subordinates will have time to react before an evaluation is written.

I WOULD recognize that I won't be a lieutenant very long and that I need to scope out my future on a time line. Career planning and development should be a topic of discussion with MILPERCEN and with senior officers in my branch. (Include your family development. Your family will have a big impact on your career as it progresses.) (A current list of MI Branch contacts was printed in the April-June issue of *Military Intelligence*. You should personally visit MILPERCEN at your earliest opportunity and establish an "eyeball" relationship with your assignment officer.)

I WOULD keep handy, and frequently review, a list of leadership actions which I should be accomplishing as a professional leader. I would, at the very least:

- **Lead by example.**
- **Be considerate.**
- **Tend to the needs of soldiers.**
- **Maintain loyalty up and down.**
- **Make quality a habit.**
- **Build "staying power."**
- **Cultivate credibility.**
- **Reward the deserving.**
- **Develop pride.**
- **Follow through.**
- **Be ready.**

Look beyond these "bullets" for the *meaning*—then develop your own operating style which lets you carry out the actions in a way which is natural to your personality. Read your feedback constantly and carefully; it'll show you where you need to do some work in the leadership area.

I WOULD maintain a personal working file on all finance and personnel actions that pertain to myself. (You might want to put your important papers in a commercial depository for safekeeping.) I would make sure my checking account stayed straight and that I could do basic arithmetic. (Don't be careless with your finances and be especially watchful if a joint account is involved.) I would program periodic leave and take it. (Encourage your subordinates to do likewise. They need to "get away from it all" once in awhile just as you do.)

I WOULD continuously evaluate my professional strengths and weaknesses as a participating member of my own chain of command. I would ask myself, "Have I gained the trust and respect of my soldiers?" I would recognize that I have only four categories of resources: people, equipment, time, and operating funds. (Most of your resources are fixed at your level. *Your* professionalism will be measured by how efficiently and economically you convert your resources into mission accomplishment.)

I WOULD not intentionally embarrass a fellow soldier in public. (Let the individual know in advance when

you plan to bring up a matter pertaining to his area of responsibility.) I would carefully avoid saying or writing anything I wouldn't want quoted back to me later. (And don't allege more than you can prove—you may be asked to do so some day.) I would understand that I live in a "fishbowl." Both my on-duty and off-duty conduct must be impeccable and beyond reproach at all times.

I WOULD learn how to write. I would be embarrassed professionally if my boss had to rewrite my correspondence. (Get AR 340-15, *Preparing Correspondence*; AR 310-50, *Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes*; and a good dictionary and a good thesaurus. Use them all. Other useful books: **Harbrace College Handbook**,

7th Edition, and **Elements of Style**, 3rd Edition. I would require my subordinates to develop good writing techniques and I would proofread everything before sending it forward. (Extra training may be required; if so, lay it on.)

I WOULD make sure that I (and a spouse, if applicable) learned basic social graces, such as "RSVP" and "Regrets only." (Several books are available to help you in this area; check with your company commander or battalion adjutant. DA Pamphlet 600-60, *A Guide to Protocol and Etiquette for Official Entertainment*, contains good information and an excellent bibliography.) I would teach my spouse basic Army organization, the names of key people, and something

about my job. I would keep my spouse informed and encourage social participation.

I WOULD evaluate my civilian education and seek opportunities for improvement, keeping in mind that my first goal is to be a good, solid *leader*.

I WOULD ensure that my personal affairs are kept in order, including finances, personnel records, will, and emergency data card. (JAG officers can help you with this one. Also, commercial organizations can be of great help. Carefully evaluate your own situation to determine if you need assistance. DA Pamphlet 360-531, *Your Personal Affairs—A Checklist*, should be part of your package.)

WITH REGARD TO MY COMPANY

I WOULD thoroughly know my company Emergency Deployment Plan, as well as the installation Emergency Deployment OPLAN, and be sure my subordinates know the plan and can execute it in a professional manner.

I WOULD fully and openly support the company commander and first sergeant, even if I might privately disagree. (You may express disagreement in private but, if overruled, then give 100 percent support. After all, they just might be right. And then, *issue orders in your own name*. Don't

tell your troops they have to do something because "the old man" is making it happen. You lose respect and authority if you don't issue orders as if they were of your own initiative.)

I WOULD openly honor and respect the position of the company first sergeant. (He doesn't outrank you, but his unique title and position warrant your special professional consideration.)

I WOULD learn as much about the company structure that supports my platoon as I could. (To be really effective, you need to know about

your unit supply, motor pool, orderly room, training, NBC, arms room, reenlistment, safety, and so forth.)

I WOULD make sure that what I think I am supposed to be doing is what my boss thinks I'm supposed to be doing. (Then see that you're "doing more doing" than "thinking about doing." A periodic joint review of your OER Support Form 67-8-1 can be helpful here.)

I WOULD actively support the unit sports program, both as a participant and observer, when possible.

WITH REGARD TO MY PLATOON

I WOULD use troop welfare, morale, pride, and *esprit de corps* as common denominators for every action I took in leading my troops. I would work hard to maintain an excellent working relationship with my platoon sergeant and I would openly support him. (You set the standards and policies to guide him, then let *him* function as an NCO. Ask for and consider his advice in your decisionmaking process and don't ever "put down" your platoon sergeant in front of your soldiers.)

I WOULD know what my NCOs are supposed to do, then I would see to

it that they do it in a professional manner. (Don't do it for them—let them earn their titles and pay.) I would ensure my NCOs are maintaining high levels of order, discipline, and cleanliness in my troop work and billet areas. (Be especially attentive to the billets on weekends and holidays—a few uncaring soldiers can make billet living an unpleasant experience. Don't let that happen in your platoon—check it personally and frequently.)

I WOULD pay special attention to NCOs in section sergeant level positions and help them in their leader-

ship roles. (Many of your junior sergeants are in their first leadership positions and will need help. Don't assume they know a great deal—they may not, and it is simply a function of experience. Be patient, but make them study and work hard at being good leaders.)

I WOULD get my own copy of AR 623-105 and AR 623-205. (These ARs prescribe the evaluation reporting systems for officers and enlisted soldiers. Study them and evaluate your subordinates properly. Also, know how *you* are being evaluated.) I would establish and watch closely the rating

scheme and submission times of OERs and EERs for my subordinates. (You can quickly get behind in this area. Pay attention to the paperwork aspects of your personnel managment actions—most key personnel moves will generate multilayer EER or OER requirements.)

I WOULD insist on absolute control over the people and property allocated to me by the MTOE for my mission responsibilities. I would then lay out my platoon organization, match my people and property to it, and firmly fix responsibility and accountability for both through my chain of command. I would have secure areas constructed to store my platoon equipment. Field gear for off-post personnel would have to meet the same availability, cleanliness and storage criteria as for on-post personnel. (If you don't provide space and an SOP, field gear will be all over the place and much of it will get lost.)

I WOULD sort out my platoon equipment and make sure I have trained and licensed principal operators for every piece of equipment and that licensed back-up operators are available or in training. Reluctant soldiers, those not wishing to be honored with a military driver's license, would receive intensive extra training to help them obtain a license. (Don't let your equipment be dispatched without your control over it—could be that some untrained operator will "save" his equipment and ruin yours.)

I WOULD conduct frequent open-ranks and equipment layout inspections to verify that my chain of command has already achieved and is maintaining my high standards. (Make sure you are in line with the company and battalion SOP. Also keep in mind that we no longer have a simple "uniform" but rather "multiforms" when it comes to individual dress for our soldiers, for example, male, female, maternity, cooks' whites, and jungle fatigues.)

I WOULD study FM 22-5, *Drill and Ceremonies*, in detail and insist that drill and ceremonies conducted by my platoon were done properly. (Do it right and do it sharply.) I would learn how to prepare my platoon for inspection and how to report to a senior officer that my platoon was prepared for inspection. (Don't forget to actually prepare your platoon for inspection—you must personally check it out if you want to avoid embarrassment some day.)

I WOULD make sure my soldiers have appropriate soldier's manuals for their MOS and grade and that my sergeants know and can do everything their soldiers are supposed to know and do as outlined in the manuals. (Also ensure trainer's guides for each MOS in your platoon are on hand or on requisition and that they are being used by your trainers.) I would be able to personally do all the common tasks identified in FM 21-2 and FM 21-3. (If you don't know how to do some of the tasks, your troops will be proud to teach you if you let them. Don't worry about loss of respect if you tell them you don't know how to do something—they probably already know.)

I WOULD see that section chiefs and squad leaders make good use of available job books and, if a job book for an MOS in my platoon is not available, I would design one myself. I would get a copy of, and use, the division HIP Pocket Training Handbook. (Ensure that each of your leaders uses it too!)

I WOULD learn the Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS) as it applies to my platoon. (Get TM 38-750, *The Army Maintenance Management System*, DA Pam 750-1, *Organizational Guide For Leaders*, and FM 29-2, *Organizational Maintenance Operations*, as a minimum and you can get a good start on your organizational maintenance program. Also get and read the monthly issues of *P.S. Magazine*. Read FM 10-14-1, *Commander's Handbook For Property Accountability At Unit Level*, to help you understand unit supply.) I would get a copy of the "DASH 10" operator's manual for each major item of equipment in my platoon and be fully capable of performing proper Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) on that item. (The automotive and communications technicians, as well as the unit armorers, will be glad to help you.) I would ensure that when my platoon is at the motor pool, I am also at the motor pool (teaching maintenance techniques to my soldiers and ensuring the health of my PMCS program).

I WOULD set very high standards and demand compliance by my chain of command members first and then by every member of my platoon. (Don't worry about whether your soldiers like you at this point. Your first job is to set and achieve high standards. In the long run, your troops will respect you if you do.)

I WOULD try to have the same chain of command for mission accomplishment as for billeting control and personnel accountability, such as reporting in company formations. For example, I would want a maintenance section sergeant to be accountable and responsible for his section equipment and for what each member of his section does or fails to do. *His* promotion would depend on how well both technical and troop leading duties are carried out.

I WOULD inspect my chain of command personnel on every contact and initiate corrective action on the spot. I would require that persons ordered to take corrective actions report back to me at a specified time and place to verify compliance. I would not hesitate to lay extra training on any person under my command who was slow to shape up. I would stand in the last rank of my platoon occasionally to check the receiving end of verbal information—Accusative? Inspiring? (Think morale.)

I WOULD meet with each new soldier on the day he is assigned to my platoon, ensure his immediate needs are met (family settled, bunk assigned, bedding issued, meal card issued), and ensure he is familiar with the post recreation services. (Don't "lose" a soldier due to neglect during his inprocessing—first impressions are important.)

I WOULD vigorously seek appropriate school quotas for my soldiers and ensure they are ready to attend school. (Use recent attendees to get programmed attendees ready. Develop and have ready an Order of Merit List so if one of your troops can't make it, you've got the next in line alerted and ready to take his place. This reduces no-shows and failures.)

I WOULD know how to communicate in a tactical situation—for example, how to use automated CEOI, how to prepare and operate FM radio sets in secure and unsecure modes, and how to lay in a field telephone system.

I WOULD personally inspect my platoon members' weapons. (Include the crew served weapons and check out the level of crew training. Remember, this is *not* the armorer's job, it's that of the chain of command.) I would take care of and clean my own assigned weapon.

I WOULD take PT with my platoon and watch closely the attendance of every soldier. I would see to it that everyone could pass the PT test unless medically excused. I would enforce the Army Weight Control Program.

I WOULD be tough on discipline, personal appearance, soldier training, and organizational equipment maintenance. I would be alert for and prohibit fraternization which might be detrimental to the morale of my platoon. (Watch out for *perceived* fraternization—it can do as much harm as the real thing. Be especially careful yourself— working late with only another soldier present, riding in POVs, innocent social affairs, and so on. All of these can create a perception of fraternization. Be alert and watch your own actions.) I would keep in mind that superior or subordinate fraternization can be just as devastating as sexual fraternization. (Make sure those in your chain of command keep their professional dis-

tance from subordinates, but balance professional distance with professional friendliness; this increases respect for everyone.)

I WOULD be alert for evidence of sexual harassment. Keep in mind targeted soldiers may be reluctant to complain for fear of reprisal. Offenders won't commit sexual harassment in your presence, only in the presence of targeted soldiers. Also, don't use or condone the use of obscene language by either sex. I would also be alert for sexual discrimination. (You might have a key person who deprives a subordinate of organizational and personal justice simply because the subordinate happens to be a member of the opposite sex. Racial discrimination can follow the same pattern. You must stay alert for both forms, caution everyone against them, and take swift and thorough action when you detect discrimination. Your job here is to ensure that *all* persons under your control have *equal* chances to succeed.)

I WOULD watch my platoon chain of command for evidence of drug and alcohol abuse. (Remember, mind-altering substances of any sort do not mix with leadership. And if you drink and have had "a few at the club," don't go to the barracks at night and try to be someone you aren't. Go home and behave yourself. Caution sergeants living in the barracks—they are more likely to bump into such situations than you are.)

I WOULD get involved in military discipline actions pertaining to any member of my platoon and strive for

absolute justice. (Take the time to discover the truth about what happened or allegedly happened—don't allow an innocent soldier to be punished.)

I WOULD know, and watch closely, the promotion process in my platoon, especially the Promotion Eligibility Roster (SIDPERS C-01). No member of my platoon would be promoted nor go before a promotion board without my personal approval and I would personally make sure that every soldier knew and understood the platoon/ company promotion process. (Include NCO and warrant officer input in your decisions to promote or not to promote. Follow through and ensure your soldiers know why you did whatever you did. Keep in mind that promotions are as important to individual soldiers as your promotion is to you.) I would know how promotion points are accumulated by my soldiers and then help the deserving ones. (For example, certificates of achievement from a lieutenant colonel are worth five points, but only a total of 10 points may be used in this category, and so on.)

I WOULD know the re-enlistment status of everyone in my platoon. If I had an undesirable soldier, I would initiate action to get him barred from re-enlisting and administratively removed from the Army, if appropriate. I would then vigorously encourage every satisfactory soldier in my platoon to *stay in the Army*. I would be dissatisfied with myself if I let a good soldier leave my platoon without knowing I had done everything possible to get him to stay in the Army.

WITH REGARD TO MY SOLDIERS

I WOULD be constantly on the alert for their safety—both on the job and where they live. (Be tough, insist on safety in everything you and your troops do.) I would seek to understand my soldiers in terms of what drives and motivates them. (Soldiers represent the best that America has to offer. Get to know yours well.)

I WOULD keep my soldiers informed of everything that affects them. (This is perhaps the biggest problem at platoon/section level—don't let it

happen in your unit. Soldiers need to make plans for future events just as you do. You need to let them know how and when their time is going to be affected by your plans. Be careful about how you execute changes to your plans—big potential for morale problems.)

I WOULD teach my soldiers something about personal money management. (Find out who is broke two days after payday—chances are some help is needed. Also, check your soldier's

Leave and Earning Statements for problems such as pay withheld or incorrect deductions. Pass on some of your smarts, demonstrate your concern for your soldiers' welfare. If *you* are broke two days after payday, you may also need some help.) I would recognize that soldiers have but two resources while in the Army—their free time and their money. I would not deprive my soldiers of either resource without full justification nor would I allow anyone else to do so. (UCMJ punishment locks in on these two

resources—make sure personal, organizational, and military justice prevails.)

I WOULD ensure that my soldiers are receiving constructive counseling and I would personally review their counseling statements. I would frequently visit my soldiers in their billets during off-duty hours and take the time to stop and chat with them. I would make sure that I spent time "listening with them" rather than "talking at them." I would frequently visit and eat meals in the dining facility. (Sit down, chat, and have your meal with your soldiers. Although your presence might give them indigestion, it also gives them something to write home about. And don't "buck the line." Your own soldiers may be on a tighter schedule than you are. Bucking the chow line is no way to win friends and influence people— especially your own.)

I WOULD be aware of signs of alcohol and drug abuse in my soldiers. (If abuse is detected, take immediate action, remembering to balance disciplinary action with professional medical help, as appropriate.)

AND FINALLY ...

I WOULD recognize that the above "I woulds" deal with setting high standards for myself and my soldiers. And, Lieutenant, always remember that the day you compromise a standard, you've set a new one—lower. ★

Lt. Col. James R. Riser graduated from Pennsylvania Military College as a distinguished military graduate in 1967. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in Military Intelligence, he initially served a two-year combat arms detail in Armor. His previous assignments have included: Tank Platoon Leader and Battalion S2, 1/13th Armor, 1st Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Cavalry Platoon Leader, 2/17 Cavalry (ABN), 101st Airborne Division, Vietnam; Special Security Officer, HQDA, the Pentagon; Assistant Brigade S2, 2nd Brigade and Assistant Division G2, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky.; Detachment Commander, 2nd MI Detachment, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea; Senior Combat Intelligence Instructor, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.; Research and Development Project Officer, Center for Systems Engineering and Integration, Fort Monmouth, N.J.; Battalion Executive Officer and Battalion Commander, 501st Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI), 1st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany; Chief, Intelligence Division (ASIC), G2, VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany. Riser is a graduate of the airborne and Ranger courses, Armor Officer Basic Course, MI Officer Advanced Course, and the Command and General Staff College. He received a master's degree in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University in 1975. Riser currently serves as commander of the 101st MI Battalion (CEWI), 1st Infantry Division (M), Fort Riley, Kansas.

These tips were adapted from a similar version originally authored by Col. Robert H. Pratt who developed them as a guide for his officers in 1982.

REFORGER '84

AN EW PLATOON TAKES A HARD LOOK AT SOP

by Sgt. Lynn Lyerly

When soldiers from the 105th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) think of REFORGER '84, they remember rain. But besides an intense appreciation for a roof over their heads and a comfortable bed to sleep in, they also brought back from REFORGER questions and plans for refining and revising operations.

The 3rd Electronic Warfare (EW) Platoon, Alpha Company, was forced to rethink many old assumptions, redirect some areas of training, and refine team working environments based on what the unit learned in Germany.

Prior to REFORGER, the 3rd EW Platoon was a direction finding (DF) platoon, with three outstations and a platoon operations center (POC). However, Alpha Company had limited success netting three AN/TRQ-37s during several division training exercises at Fort Polk. As a result, two EW platoons and one DF platoon were reorganized into three EW platoons with one AN/TRQ-37 (Collection/LOB), one AN/PRD-11 (Collection/LOB), one SG 886 (interference generator), and a POC. Working with new equipment, new teams, and on new terrain during an extended exercise with a 40-60 kilometer wide front gave the 3rd EW Platoon an opportunity to compare operations at Fort Polk with operations at REFORGER. During the exercise, the platoon discovered what its capabilities and limitations will be on the modern battlefield. The following are areas that need more consideration.

COLLECTION/LOB

The TRQ-37 teams (with the hut mounted on an M1028/CUCV, generators and a jeep with trailor for a support vehicle) were used mainly for collection. Their overall DF capability was drastically reduced because there was only one TRQ-37 per POC, limiting the platoon to lines of bearing (LOBs). Had all three TRQ-37s been subordinate to the same POC, DF capabilities would have been reduced to only one sector on the front. Questions still remain as to how important fixes versus LOBs will be on the battlefield and how a CEWI battalion which decides to subordinate all DF teams to the same POC would employ them on the battlefield. The 3rd EW Platoon found LOBs useful for confirming a unit on the move and, in some cases, for tracking movement along a road or highway. LOBs might not, however, satisfy division or brigade intelligence requirements as quickly or as accurately as fixes could.

The PRD-11 teams were also used for collection. However, with such a vast area of terrain to cover, their DF capabilities were extremely limited.

EQUIPMENT

For support, the 3rd EW Platoon overwhelmingly preferred the jeeps (M151A2) used at REFORGER to the CUCVs used at Fort Polk. Jeeps have greater maneuverability in dense terrain and mud. They can reach almost any area. This gives the platoon a chance to decide how a site will be set up—a definite advantage when working with large vehicles, trailers, and antennas.

PRD-11 teams preferred working out of two jeeps, one for operations and one for reporting, thus keeping their system highly mobile. The POCs drew M561 Gamma Goats. The cargo area provided adequate space for three soldiers to conduct POC operations. Each POC had a VRC-46 and VRC-47 secure radio in the Gamma Goat. The AN/TYQ-10 analytical shelters were not deployed with the unit. This cut down on maintenance requirements and allowed the 3rd EW Platoon to draw a cargo trailer instead of a power generation system. After redeploying to Fort Polk, the 3rd EW Platoon installed map boards and two VRC-46 radios in its Gamma Goat to further refine the M561 as a POC vehicle.

SITE SELECTION

Before REFORGER, it was SOP that platoon leaders select sites and decide when assets would reposition. But the speed at which the front line moved and the failure of assembled intelligence data to filter up and down the echelons fast enough to meet movement demands prompted the platoon to reexamine certain basic assumptions. Since a team leader understands his or her equipment, how it should be positioned, and is actually at the proposed site, he or she is in an ideal position to evaluate the site's advantages and disadvantages. Consequently, during REFORGER, it seemed more effective to let team leaders choose the site within a location range established by the platoon leaders.

CAMOUFLAGE

Pre-REFORGER SOP also stated that as soon as the site was secured and communications established, a site should be camouflaged. At Fort Polk and at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, Calif., battles do not move fast enough to prohibit camouflaging. But at REFORGER, the 3rd EW Platoon covered more terrain in a shorter period of time than during other training exercises. Some teams had to jump four or five times a day. Often a team would pull into a site, camouflage, and begin the mission, only to be told to tear down and jump within the hour. The platoon soon realized that compromises had to be made between site security and mission requirements. Consequently, a flexible policy was developed to allow for both periods of fast paced movement and periods of little to no movement.

POC LOCATION

At NTC and Fort Polk it had been common practice to colocate POCs with brigade TOCs and to lay a landline to the brigade liason. At NTC and on most other FTXs, POCs are in a direct support role, reporting tactical data to the technical control and analysis element (TCAE), which plays a general support role to division. Colocation with the brigades occurs because of the lack of FM secure radios at brigade and in the POCs and in order to facilitate timelier reporting and coordination. However, at REFORGER, the drawbacks of colocation with brigade forced the 3rd EW Platoon to rethink this practice. First, the platoon had to face certain constraints encountered at the site which brigade had selected for set-up. Often the platoon found itself on lower ground and farther away than mission would have dictated. Throughout one major battle, one team was forced to relay through another team—even though the platoon had 292 antennas, the second team was not within communications range. Another disadvantage to colocation with brigade became apparent during the first jump: the platoon was torn down and ready to move within a half hour after receiving word to move, but TOC elements required more time to tear down and additional coordination with division before relocation. If the 3rd EW platoon had additional personnel and equipment, it

could delegate personnel, a vehicle and a radio with secure communications as Jump POC/Relay or as a reporting station for brigade.

Taking limitations (TO&E and real life fill) into account, the 3rd EW Platoon determined that POCs should at least be allowed to move forward to a temporary site near the new TOC location. Where reporting is concerned, processing and analysis could be done at this temporary location, alleviating the backlog which results from the teardown and convoy dead time when moving with the brigade.

MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT

Perhaps the most valuable lesson learned at REFORGER was that a unit can never have enough radios. The POC began the exercise with three radios—one for communicating up echelon, one for down echelon, and one spare. When the TRQ-37 team's radio went down and was sent to the rear for repair, the spare had to be employed. When the second radio went down, the remaining radio had to be used for both collection and reporting, causing bottle-necking and degrading timeliness in reporting. During the defensive phase of the battle, two POCs were supporting the same brigade, so the platoon ended up relaying information to the brigade through another POC. When communications were lost with the other POC, information was relayed through one of the outstations. This caused inevitable delays in report flow. If the platoon had additional radios and personnel, it would not have had to crowd two intel nets on one frequency or to use unique frequencies to collect and report on one radio. If such an expansive battlefield can be expected in a future war, consideration has to be given to bringing communication and electronic maintenance forward. And since the width of the front may isolate the POCs from the technical support provided by the TCAE, the platoons will need additional manpower in the POCs in order to perform technical analysis, when necessary.

POC FUNCTIONS

According to FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, a POC is to perform only the most rudimentary analysis; long-term analysis is the function of the TCAE. At REFORGER, our POC was required to provide combat information to bri-

gade and technical data to the TCAE. The platoon discovered that it could not accomplish both of these functions. In fact, the platoon rarely had communications with the TCAE except by RATT Rig when it was up and operational. Moreover, the pace of battle dictated that more long-term and technical analysis be done in the POC than doctrine outlines. This leads to a most important question: How large an operating front can an EW platoon expect in combat? If a wide operational area is expected, then units must train and plan for it. This means beefing up personnel in the POCs. In addition, POC personnel must be kept proficient in Order of Battle (OB) and long-term analysis. In other words, a POC must be able to function as a miniature TCAE if isolated. On the other hand, if the function of the POC is solely to sanitize and prioritize what is reported to brigade and foward all else to the TCAE, provisions must be made to retain communications at all times.

As a result of what the 3rd EW Platoon learned at REFORGER, the unit has revised SOPs and re-directed training in many areas. The platoon has also started to cross-train in essential Military Occupational Specialties. A new program was developed which allows EW platoons to rotate into the TCAE, training with the TCAE and becoming integrated with the TCAE for FTXs. This program is already providing long-term and technical analysis training for EW analysts and collectors. The 3rd EW Platoon has also placed new emphasis on OB training, and platoon POCs and teams have rewritten SOPs to better deal with a combat environment. In short, given the present manpower and equipment shortages, the experience which the 3rd EW Platoon gained at REFORGER demonstrated the need to develop realistic, flexible policies and to train to meet all contingencies. ★

Sgt. Lynn Lyerly is a 98C2LRU assigned to Alpha Company, 105th MI Bn (CEWI) as squad leader of the 3rd EW Platoon Operations Center. She is a graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill with a degree in American Studies. Lyerly's military education includes the Russian Intermediate Course at DLI and the Enciphered Communications Analyst Course (U-1).

LACK of COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LINGUISTS

THE 142d MI BATTALION'S ANSWER

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by Maj. Harold G. Wilsted

Under the one-Army concept, the National Guard and the Army Reserve have taken on new significance. These Reserve Component forces must be ready on short notice, not only to mobilize in support of the active Army, but in effect, to merge with it into a single effective fighting force.

In the field of counterintelligence (CI), mobilization will sometimes require individuals to be integrated into existing active Army units rather than to mobilize an entire reserve unit to a specific location. For the Utah National Guard's 142d Military Intelligence (Linguistic) Battalion, individual integration into active units currently takes place on a routine basis, although the assignments in support of the active component are of short duration.

With tensions around the world at a high pitch, as evidenced by the high incidence of terrorism, renewed cold war rhetoric, and open hostilities in Afghanistan and Central America, the need for qualified CI agents is acute. Moreover, there is a critical requirement for CI personnel fluent in foreign languages. An increasingly important role for the 142d MI Battalion is to provide personnel qualified both in languages and CI skills. This dual training requirement has resulted in some interesting challenges.

Initial CI Training

Prior to 1984, the battalion had approximately 15 qualified CI personnel, some who had several years of active duty service during the Vietnam era and others who had just recently completed their training.[1] For various reasons, the unit's mission evolved almost overnight from an interrogator/translator function to a multidisciplined assignment including CI activities. The challenge was to train about 65 selected linguists in CI skills within an eight-month period without seriously interrupting their civilian employment. By way of comparison, the CI course for reservists normally requires three years for completion, one two-week phase each year.

The unit's initial CI training began in January 1984 and was completed the following August. There were one or two weekend drills each month with a considerable amount of homework in between. The final phase was a three-week summer camp at the Utah National Guard's Camp W. G. Williams.

One of the challenges faced by Maj. Erin Milligan, the school commandant, was to find qualified instructors to teach subcourses ranging from constitutional law to tactical counterintelligence. These resources were found primarily within the unit, which included three attorneys and several experienced intelligence personnel. Most of the 15 unit members who were

CI-qualified served as instructors. Additional instructors and evaluators were provided by a local Utah military installation and the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca.[2]

Concepts relating to constitutional law, criminal law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice were taught in the first phase of instruction. There are six members of the 142d with Juris Doctor degrees. Three of these were students of the 142d CI course and three were instructors of the legal subcourse. One practicing attorney, while attending the CI course, simultaneously acted as an instructor of the legal subcourse.

The credentials of the students in this particular class were unusual indeed. Almost all were college graduates. Of these, there were several students with master's degrees and four with doctorate degrees. One student was a state legislator, while another had served as a bishop in his church. There were even several police officers. Most of the students had lived in foreign countries for two to three years, not including time spent in the military. Each student was fluent in at least one foreign language and many were fluent in several. Several members of the class had seen action in Vietnam, most as intelligence officers.

In spite of the administrative, logistic, and instructional challenges of putting together a full-fledged counterintelligence school in a linguistic

unit, the experiment was a success. The instruction was comparable to that of USAR schools. Often when an instructor did not have experience in the assigned topic, a student with that particular expertise would offer background information to the class. Students, instructors, and staff went beyond the normal requirements by providing personal equipment for the benefit of all—from legalized Uzi submachine guns to air conditioners and word processors. The Army evaluated and accredited the course, and there are now about 85 multilingual CI personnel in the battalion.

CI Training at Weekend Drills

With the completion of the initial course, CI training continues during weekend drills. At the company level, 50 percent of the training time is devoted to language training and 50 percent to MOS training. In the 142d, language training and language related missions come under the direction of the Battalion S3. CI missions and training are the responsibility of the S2.

During weekend drills, CI training is predominantly comprised of textbook study, practice interviews, and reporting preparation. Specific training topics are determined by each company's CI platoon leader, with the battalion S2 providing supplemental materials and periodic training seminars during the company's scheduled drill. Video equipment is sometimes used in conjunction with computerized training software developed at Fort Huachuca on a variety of subjects. One such example is a program on weapons identification within Warsaw Pact nations.

Annual Training

Members of the 142d MI Battalion may fulfill their two-week annual training in a variety of ways. This training may consist of a normal company summer camp at the Utah National Guard facilities at Camp W. G. Williams or an assignment to the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif. Other possibilities include courses at Fort Huachuca, attendance at the Army language conference (most recently held at Brigham Young University), or an actual mission in support of an active Army command. Other annual training opportunities, apart from actual missions, consist primarily of intensive language training, often provided by university language professors under contract with U.S. Army Forces Command.

The regularly scheduled annual summer camp is one of the most effective times to train in tactical CI. One possibility for future summer camp training might include setting up and securing a field office in support of a tactical unit. The 19th Special Forces Group, a tactical unit of the Utah National Guard, is a good candidate for such combined training. Map exercises, interrogations, physical security, and human intelligence exercises may also be included.

Additional Readiness Training

The Army Readiness Training program provides additional training opportunities to sharpen CI skills. In addition, groups of CI personnel are provided periodic training in specific skills, such as vehicular and foot surveillance, in conjunction with the First Maneuver Training Command in Denver, Colo.

Missions

When the battalion accepts an interrogator/translator mission, the companies are tasked to select the personnel for the mission. Each year one company has responsibility for CONUS missions and another company has responsibility for OCONUS missions. Assignments rotate between companies on an annual basis.

Because of the relatively small number of CI personnel in the battalion, the S2 coordinates CI missions directly. Agents are selected for a particular mission by means of a computerized data base containing a list of all qualified CI personnel by name, rank, unit, level of clearance, language (including competency level), experience, prior missions, and availability. When a requirement comes down for a German-speaking CI agent, an immediate judgment can be made as to who has the qualifications and would be available during the time required. That individual or group is then contacted and the necessary paperwork is initiated.

Summary

CI training at the 142d MI Battalion has some unique qualities due to the necessity of maintaining language skills as well as MOS proficiency. This unit has responded to the need for linguists trained in the art of counterintelligence. In the process, the citizen soldier has been exposed to new ways of rendering meaningful service to his or her country. The members of the 142d MI Battalion are ready, willing,

and able to tackle assignments that are emerging as a result of this dual training. As professionals, they realize that success will come only as a result of thorough preparation for meeting today's unlimited challenges. ★

Footnotes

1. The original 15 CI personnel were primarily Scandinavian linguists. Although Scandinavia's strategic importance as the gateway to the Baltic cannot be overemphasized, U.S. military presence there is minimal. As a result of the paucity of Scandinavian missions, linguists for this area were the most available personnel in the battalion for cross training. The 142d is currently seeking language-related assignments in Scandinavian countries as liaison to NATO forces, translators in joint exercises, or short-term embassy assignments.

2. The 142d MI Battalion is appreciative of the support given by a number of interested parties. The Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca supplied instructors, evaluators, and material. The 502d MI Group has been very supportive, as have the Intelligence Security Command (INSCOM) and FORSCOM. Many other members of the intelligence community have supported the 142d MI Battalion in numerous ways.

Major Harold Wilsted is an attorney in Salt Lake City, Utah. He served as an aerial surveillance officer in Vietnam and as a General Staff Officer in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Army Pacific Command. While there, Wilsted was assigned as a courier for President Nixon during the negotiations with the People's Republic of China. Wilsted's reserve experience has included an assignment as the security manager of the 96th Army Reserve Command. He is currently serving as S2 of the 142d MI (Linguistic) Battalion, Utah Army National Guard. Wilsted graduated with honors from Brigham Young University. Before enlisting in the Army, he completed graduate work in Biological Oceanography at the University of Hawaii. He also holds a master's degree in Business Administration and a Juris Doctor degree. Wilsted resided in Denmark from 1962 to 1965 and is fluent in Danish and Norwegian with some knowledge of Swedish.

FORSCOM

THE NEW LANGUAGE PROGRAM

WILL IT WORK?

••

by CW3 Garry L. Smith

It was a sight for sore eyes to see U.S. Army Forces Command Circular 350-84-11, *FORSCOM Command Language Program*, published and disseminated.

After so many years of neglect and outright abuse of language assets, it is encouraging to see some very talented and capable people in FORSCOM trying to solve the complex problem of bringing our linguists up to proficiency levels compatible with combat mission requirements.

In essence, FORSCOM has directed that an Arrivals Training Program be established in military intelligence units to raise the foreign language proficiency of incoming linguists who do not meet the proficiency standard required of their MOS. These individuals will receive language training for half of their duty day for six months to raise their proficiency test scores to acceptable levels. Furthermore, once a soldier reaches the mandated level, or if he or she is already at that level, the linguist will be enrolled in a Unit Training Program designed to maintain and enhance these skills. The circular also addresses a myriad of other topics such as responsibilities of various command and staff elements and the procedures for hiring contract instructors.

The circular is well written. Obviously, much thought and effort have gone into this comprehensive plan of action. It is an attempt to bridge the chasm that exists between the current state of linguistic readiness and the minimum required proficiency needed to perform individual and collective combat tasks. However, I believe that there are some conditions that inherently exist down to the tactical MI unit level that could derail this program before it ever gets off the ground. The proverbial road to perdition being paved with good intentions may unfortunately apply to language programs too.

The first thing that needs to be addressed is the turbulence that exists in planned foreign language training now being conducted at Army education centers. Language training, if conducted at all, is constantly being interrupted by field exercises, IG inspections, post details, range firing, parades, grass cutting, snow removal, police calls—you name it. Everything, and I do mean everything, has precedence over language training; it is only undertaken when there is nothing else going on. Even when teaching in units fortunate enough to have contract foreign language instructors, instructors cannot realistically expect to see the same students twice in a row. The rule and not the exception is that a student may show up for one session, come back two or three days later, not show up for a week or two, and finally come back for a session only to be pulled out to go down to the motor pool. Assuming a student is able to attend class at all, his or her fellow classmates will all have different attitudes, aptitudes, abilities, and proficiencies since there is usually no way to split a constantly fluctuating group into sections. This situation makes it absolutely impossible for an instructor to take a class progressively from beginning chapters of a text to more advanced chapters. Right now, many outstanding foreign language textbooks are being developed for unit programs, but they are not going to be worth the paper they are printed on if they are used to teach language under these disruptive conditions. Also, what instructor of any quality will tolerate such a ridiculous training situation for any length of time?

Just for the sake of argument, let us assume that unit commanders and supervisors are willing to support the Arrivals Training Program and will not throw any roadblocks in the way of incoming linguists who need to attend language training. Also, let us assume that there will not be any pressure against those linguists undergoing this training from soldiers who have passed their incoming proficiency

test and are now having to pull the majority of details and field exercises. Again, assuming that supervisors can become expert personnel managers and can channel those powerful group dynamics that exist at the unit level into positive support, we are still going to have an ineffective program if we do not deal with the training turbulence that plagues the programs we now have, and will most assuredly destroy future unit training programs if allowed to go unchecked.

There is a way to beat training turbulence and still be able to perform all of the taskings that tactical MI commanders are faced with daily. In fact, this is now being done in a small but very effective program here at Fort Campbell, and the results have been quite dramatic. The general concepts of this program, discussed below, could be expanded and put into operation in all FORSCOM MI units that have linguists. First, though, I want to discuss the background of some things that have been tried at Fort Campbell and how this FORSCOM program can benefit from our successes and failures.

In 1984, the 311th MI Battalion at Fort Campbell experimented with two language programs. One program was established with a full-time language instructor, and has turned out to be almost identical to the Unit Training Program that is mandated by the recent FORSCOM circular. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of a sincere and forceful chain of command, the program has continued to fall victim to the turbulence described above. Regardless of how much commanders desire that a language program succeed, very little can be done to provide comprehensive training under current unit organizations that do not or cannot prevent constant interruptions.

The second program, and the one that I think could serve as a model throughout FORSCOM for language programs, is language-related MOS training for 98Gs (Voice Intercept). It works like this: four 98Gs are rotated through training for two weeks at a time and are exempt during this period from all other activities. Whatever else is going on—parades, guard duty, or field duty—these people continue to undergo a comprehensive program of language instruction. Reaction from everyone concerned—commanders, program managers, and linguist participants—indicates the program has added significantly to the combat intelligence capability of the 311th MI Battalion.

The concepts contained in this second program could be implemented by creating a language company in every parent battalion. For example, an MI battalion typically has four companies: headquarters and headquarters operations company, Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie. I propose that a fifth company be added—Delta Company. Delta would be a language company that would strictly be an administrative unit with no tactical equipment. This unit would be composed of a company commander, an administrative sergeant, a couple of platoon sergeants, and all of the battalion's language-qualified 97Bs (Counterintelligence), 97Es (Interrogation), 98Cs (Electronic Warfare Analyst), 98Gs, and all of the language-qualified warrant officer equivalents. Upon deployment, this company would completely disappear and its members would be sent with the MI companies that they doctrinally support. In addition, Delta Company would be broken down into first and second language platoons with personnel in each language-required MOS divided roughly in half and placed in one of these two platoons. One language platoon would be assigned for duty to the companies that these personnel would normally support for all exercises, maintenance, CQ, staff duty NCO, IGs, post details, parades, and police calls. The other platoon's sole mission during this time would be to participate in the Arrivals Training Program and the Unit Training Program. After a predetermined period of time the platoons would switch missions.

MI units that have a language requirement and are smaller than CEWI battalions—detachments and companies—could still have the same type of split-training program by putting all of their linguists into a separate language platoon. This platoon could be broken down into language squads that would alternate between concentrated language study and mission support.

This proposal might, however, raise a legitimate question: couldn't all of this be accomplished by setting up the same dual system within companies that already exist, rather than by creating entirely new language companies? I think not. First of all, the language training that is being done now is fragmented due to the need to coordinate between two, and in some MI battalions, three companies. It is difficult to enforce a battalion program when more than one company commander gets involved. Also, it is too tempting for commanders and supervisors to subvert the system if they have ready access to linguists who are supposed to be undergoing language training. Even now, with all of the emphasis on language training, the language lab is an easy target for a supervisor to get quick "duty bods." Therefore, linguists need someone in a command position who can look out for their interests in a battalion. A language company commander would have tremendous influence in the way in which his soldiers are used. The commander's duties would be predominantly language related, giving him a clearer picture of his mission and what is expected of him.

Probably the best reason for having a separate language company is the fact that the unit with which the linguists are training may not be the unit with which they would go to war. An MI battalion normally is responsible for only one language: if a battalion deploys to an area requiring language capabilities other than those assigned, linguists from other MI units would have to be brought in and attached for the duration of the mission. A language company could much more easily be plugged into a deploying battalion, rather than linguists being unraveled from existing jobs and duty sections and sent piecemeal to that battalion. Also, if a company commander knows that the linguists he gets from the language company may not be permanent, he will probably put a lot more thought into how he sets up the internal organization of his own company. As it is now, squads and platoons in which linguists are assigned are arranged with little thought to the fact that those linguists who are filling jobs throughout the company—company clerk, armorer, and platoon sergeant—could be pulled out on a moment's notice and deployed with some other battalion.

Another problem of immediate concern is the difficulty in obtaining contract instructors to teach low density languages in distant or remote areas. It is very difficult to find qualified Russian instructors, for example, in Georgia or Louisiana. Even if they can be located, they will have to be contracted through the college or university that supports the education center, and the pay scale for this work is usually not impressive. In addition, if instructors have to relocate to be near a military post, they will have to do so at their own expense. However, the

fact remains that the key to a successful language program—in addition to having soldiers available to train—is to have qualified full-time instructors.

One solution to this problem would be to convert contract instructor jobs into GS positions; this may actually be in the works for future language programs. This would solve the pay and relocation problems and would allow for nationwide recruitment of potential instructors. However, as superior as this would be to the present contract system, I think that there is still a better way: one that would solve our instructor problem and at the same time add to our pool of qualified linguists available for deployment.

A new MOS—Foreign Language Instructor—could be added to the Army's list of specific occupational skills. Basic requirements for this specialty would be at least a 4-4 proficiency in the target language and in English, as well as graduation from a language instruction and management course at the Defense Language Institute. These individuals would then be assigned as foreign language instruc-

tors at MI units throughout FORSCOM. The Army population as a whole has large numbers of low density linguists who are seldom properly used as linguists, and are often not even identified. We need these people in military intelligence. Not only can they be used as instructors, but they would form a valuable pool of language talent that could be deployed right along with their students. Upon deployment, their MOS could immediately be changed from Foreign Language Instructor to Expert Linguist, an MOS that we had in the Army system some years back and probably should have kept.

The changes suggested here call for major surgery as opposed to a Band-Aid solution. It is time that we take drastic measures to solve our very dangerous foreign language problem once and for all. It is imperative that we remember that most of the things we do in military intelligence are directly related to foreign language proficiency. I think we can have soldiers who are proficient in combat skills and language skills at the same

time. All we need to do is to organize and train in a smarter way. The new FORSCOM Command Language Program coupled with some effective changes at the tactical MI unit level will do exactly that. ★

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Crossword Puzzle
by Capt. Rudolph N. Garcia

RUSSIAN MILITARY HIS II

ACROSS CLUES

1. GENERAL ZHUKOV AND "------- MUD" HELPED DEFEAT THE GERMANS AT MOSCOW, 1941.
2. SWEDISH MILITARY POWER WAS DECISIVELY BROKEN IN THIS BATTLE, 1709.
6. NICKNAME FOR WWII SOVIET MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER.
9. FIRST BATTLE IN WHICH THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND NAVY PARTICIPATED JOINTLY, 1696.
10. IN 1804, RUSSIA INVADED THIS NOW PROMINENT MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRY.
11. OVERALL COMMANDER OF THE BOLSHEVIK ARMY DURING THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR, 1918-22.
13. TUKHACHEVSKI WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE DOCTRINAL EMPLOYMENT OF THIS TYPE WEAPON SYSTEM.
19. IVAN THE III ANNEXED THIS REGION IN 1485.
20. THE RUSSIANS AND FRENCH FOUGHT THIS BATTLE TO A STALEMATE IN 1812.
21. ABBREVIATION FOR TANK REGIMENT.
24. FAMOUS RUSSIAN HISTORICAL NOVEL OF WWII WAS ENTITLED "AND QUIET FLOWS THE ---."
25. AUSTRIANS AND RUSSIANS DEFEATED FREDERICK THE GREAT IN THIS BATTLE, 1759.
29. THE GREAT -------- WAR ESTABLISHED RUSSIA AS A GREAT MILITARY POWER, 1700-21.
32. THE ---- OF THE CRIMEA TOOK MOSCOW IN 1555.
34. HIS 62D ARMY DEFENDED STALINGRAD FROM THE GERMANS, 1942-43.
35. THE GERMANS DEFENDED ALONG THE ----- RIVER IN 1943-44 AGAINST SEVERAL RUSSIAN OFFENSIVES.
36. VON MANSTEIN'S 56TH PZ. CORPS CROSSED THE ----- RIVER ON ITS ADVANCE TO LENINGRAD.

DOWN CLUES

1. RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, NOW KNOWN AS GRU, WAS EXCELLENT IN WWII.
3. THIS COUNTRY ALONG THE BLACK SEA AND THE CAUCASUS IS ONE OF RUSSIA'S TRADITIONAL ENEMIES.
4. GERMAN RECCONNAISSANCE UNITS REACHED THIS INLAND SEA IN 1942.
5. ------ WAS THE OBJ. OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY AFTER THE GERMANS WERE SURROUNDED AT STALINGRAD.
7. --- FORCES WERE FIRST ORGANIZED IN THE LATE 1950'S.
8. THIS BRANCH (ABBR.) OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY WAS DEVASTATING TO GERMAN INFANTRY IN WWII.
12. COMMANDER OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY AT BORODINO, 1812.
14. MODERN INITIALS FOR THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE.
15. THE GERMANS REACHED THIS SUBURB, 5 MILES FROM RED SQUARE IN DEC., 1941.
16. THE SOVIETS CROSSED THE ---- RIVER TO TAKE RUMANIA IN 1944.
17. MOST COMPETENT CDR OF WHITE FORCES DURING RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR, 1918-22.
18. HE COMMANDED A RUSSIAN ARMY WHICH FOUGHT FOR THE GERMANS IN WWII.
22. COMMANDER OF THE RUSSIAN 1ST ARMY AT TANNENBERG, 1914.
23. THE RUSSIANS INVADED THIS CHINESE PROVINCE IN 1945.
26. ALEXANDER ------ DEFEATED THE TEUTONIC KNIGHTS AT LAKE PEIPUS IN 1242.
27. IN 1945, 75,000 SOVIET TROOPS DESERTED TO REACH THE ------- OF WESTERN EUROPE.
28. ADMIRAL KOLCHAK'S WHITE FORCES HAD TO CROSS THIS MOUNTAIN RANGE TO ADVANCE ON MOSCOW.
30. THE FIRST NATIONAL SOVEREIGN OF RUSSIA CONQUERED THIS REGION FROM 1471 TO 1478.
31. RUSSIANS INVADED/ANNEXED THIS REGION FROM THE TARTARS IN 1552.
33. VLADIMIR II WAS THE LAST GREAT RULER OF ----, 1113-1125.

(solution on page 57)

THOUGHT INTELLIG

THE INTERSECTION OF SC

by Maj. Brian L. Raymond

> *People shy away from uncertainty and ambiguity; machines, however, are notoriously inept at coping with equivocation.*

FUL
ENCE
OLDIERS AND MACHINES

In his insightful and stimulating article, "The Analytic Leap" (**Military Intelligence** July-September '84), Richard Armstrong calls our attention to an area that has gained increasing interest as enhanced computer capabilities begin to "automate the battlefield," bringing us ever closer to the age of artificial intelligence. Rightly, he describes the inductive analytic leap as a real stumbling block in the analytic process because it "rests on probabilities," not on certainties. Dealing with uncertainty perplexes both people and machines. People shy away from uncertainty and ambiguity; machines, however, are notoriously inept at coping with equivocation. Hence, any move either to improve human analytic processes or to make machines think more like human beings must be adjusted to accommodate this reality. Moreover, we must learn to accept and trade in ambiguity if we are to produce and employ good analysis. In addition, it is necessary that managers and planners of the AirLand Battlefield decipher which tasks rightly belong to humans, which to machines, and which fall to the province of both. Individually, we may lament or applaud the latest computer developments, but we must recognize that there are several areas where we can capitalize on computer capabilities to

enhance human talents. Some areas still fall into the domain of human intellect, and we should not neglect those as we focus on the future of analysis.

To begin a discussion about people and machines thinking and analyzing, we need to establish some guidelines. Douglas Hofstadter's **Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid**, a seminal work which celebrates the essential unity of disciplines and things rather than their fundamental exclusivity, cites certain skills which help define intelligence. The skills cited include the ability to:

• **Respond to situations flexibly.**

• **Take advantage of fortuitous circumstances.**

• **Make sense out of ambiguous or contradictory messages.**

• **Recognize the relative importance of different elements of a situation.**

• **Find similarities between situations despite differences which may separate them.**

• **Draw distinctions between situations despite similarities which may link them.**

• **Synthesize new concepts by taking old concepts and putting them together in new ways.**

• **Come up with ideas which are novel.**[1]

Before we can make computers perform our analysis for us, we must first identify ways to establish measurable objectives for those categories of thought that Hofstadter cites, so that we can teach human analysts to perform them. Only then can we adapt these measures to machine processing. Unfortunately, arriving at such ostensibly obvious measures has proven to be troublesome. While we know that good analysis provides us with an accurate picture of the battlefield, we are hard pressed to discover precisely those elements that allow one analyst to develop an accurate picture with relatively few pieces of data and another to develop an inaccurate picture with even more data. Genius comes quickly to mind as an explanation; but genius is difficult to corral as an integrated whole, and even more difficult to differentiate into measurable subfunctions.

It is interesting that the mathematical terms of integration and differentiation lend themselves so well to a discussion of analysis because, as Armstrong implies in his article, if we can break up an inductive process into a discrete number of deductive protocols, we can approximate induction. "Although induction expresses only probabilities, the more often associations of events occur in the past, the more likely they are to occur in the future."[2] However, Armstrong quickly cautions, "Nothing is certain . . . the exception can always slip through the gap in induction."[3] Indeed, in other hands, this argument without its insistent caution provides the rationale for many of our new information processing systems on the battlefield. If we can gather sufficient data (get enough discrete elements to develop into deductive protocols), they contend, we can do our analysis with a computer and provide the tactical commander with ready-made intelligence, almost untouched by human hands. Hence, greater capacities and faster throughput times become the objectives by which we measure success. However, these surrogate variables may not be measuring, or even addressing, the correct elements of the process. The most robust data manipulation system is not necessarily the best analytic tool. Armstrong provides a good example in which the results, because the categories are wrong no matter how much information one gathers, will not produce good analysis. In his example he draws the syllogism: Whenever artillery is forward, the enemy attacks (major premise). The enemy's 69th Artillery Division is forward (minor premise). Therefore, the enemy will attack (conclusion).

Unfortunately, though this syllogism sounds good, Amstrong accurately points out that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. To achieve validity, a number of conditions for the major premise must be clarified. One must ask, "Does the division attack every time the artillery is forward?" And, one must also ask, "Does the division attack, if, and only if, the artillery is forward?" Though similar, these questions really point in two directions. The latter, answered affirmatively, suggests that the division will not attack unless the artillery is foward. The former supposes that

the division can attack under a number of scenarios, one of which has the artillery forward. The good analyst, it seems, understands such a distinction almost intuitively. However, the good analyst relies less heavily on formal logic systems and sharply defined probabilities to arrive at a conclusion. The good analyst employs hunches, a feel for the threat, a backgound in the area (which is at once both more and less than a data base), and finally a facility for recognition which many analysts do not possess or may never be able to acquire. At this point, even though we still lack clear, objective measures to quantify good analysis, we should not abandon the drive for a better understanding of analysis itself. Though we appear to be no closer to a practical assessment of analysis—what constitutes good analysis, what portion of that analysis belongs to humans, and what to machines—than we were at the beginning, at least we are aware of some of the pitfalls. Where then can we go for answers? First, though it seems simplistic and reductive, we must look at the end of analysis: What should it provide us? What jobs do we want it to perform?

In an article in **Defense**, Gen. John W. Vessy Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed guidelines and a paradigm for the entire C[3]I process. Analysis supports that process through the development of the situation assessment. Vessey's foremost and inviolate priority provides a focus for our analytic efforts: any process must serve the informational needs of commanders. Without that as a goal, any process has little value. Additionally, he sees the need to capture the latest technology but not to exploit technology needlessly; superfluous sophistication hampers rather than enhances the soldier's ability to work within the government. The situation assessment must, then, work to make the commander's decision as good as possible.[4]

Too often managers and leaders lose sight of Vessey's primary objective in developing systems to gather, to manipulate, and to analyze information to support those decisions. The support systems become ends in themselves and their supporting position in the constellation of integrated functions becomes unclear. The systems and the analysts that cooperate

to produce the situation assessment should attempt to render "ground truth" as accurately as possible if they are to allow a commander to engage the battle from an advantageous position founded on a solid base of knowledge. Underlying the entire process of portraying the "ground truth," however, is the unsettling spectre of uncertainty.

Highlighting the importance of uncertainty in battle, Clausewitz notes: "This difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war, by making things appear entirely different from what one had expected."[5] Not only can we not know the ground truth completely, but we can also never know just how much of what we think we know reflects the truth. More to the point, not until we can engage in post-action analysis can we discover how close our perception of the situation came to the actual situation. Post hoc analysis is sufficiently difficult in itself, yet we tend to expect the battlefield intelligence analysts to reduce to near certainty a myriad of details, often while working in a hostile environment.

As a result, we must establish certain confidence levels in our collection and analysis if our situation assessment is to be valid. Furthermore, we must ensure that the systems which process our information are not bogged down in minutiae at the expense of processing more critical information. Simply stated, the problem centers on editing. At its nub the problem involves editing from multiple dimensions into two (or at best three) truncated dimensions. Everything that exists on the battlefield does so in the full richness of breadth, depth, height, and perhaps most important, time. Everything that is analyzed and reported reduces the richness of four-dimensional action into something that can be displayed on a map board or portrayed in a narrative stream, or reflected in a picture which freezes a moment in time.

Because of the limits of support systems and of language itself, even these two-dimensional representations must attempt to distill only the information that the analyst or the reporter thinks worthy of note. Regardless of the intentions of the analysts and reporters, their narratives and pictures of the battlefield will always carry their own special biases which will skew the situation portrayed. One of our objectives, then, ought to be that we remain always cognizant of the potential bias in our reports and in those that come to us. The reports themselves are not reality; they only represent some aspect of reality.

Hence we must free our analysts to allow their minds to roam over and to massage the myriad bits and pieces of information that come to them. To do this we must engage computer support to accomplish that which a computer does best—collect, sort, compare, and present data for the analyst's consideration. In the final analysis, we must leave to the computers the massive tasks of crunching through masses of raw data, of attempting to correlate data elements, and of developing probabilities based on historical precedent and on the best knowledge available. To humans, at least for the present, we leave the tasks of evaluating, assessing, and guessing. All the while, we must remember that battles are not classic, predictable set pieces; they occupy a time and space that is of their own evolution. They cannot be managed predictably once they are met; as Clausewitz's pronouncement on chance in war tells us: "It is now quite clear how greatly the objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble—chance . . . . No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war."[6]

Understanding the formal requirements for valid syllogisms provides a valuable look in the analyst's kit bag, but it cannot supplant the requirement to be a comprehensive thinker. We need to teach our analysts how to think, and then to reward them for doing so. ★

Footnotes

1. Douglas Hofstadter, **Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid** (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 26.
2. Maj. Richard Armstrong, "The Analytic Leap," *Military Intelligence*, July-September 1984, p. 35.
3. Ibid.
4. Gen. John Vessey Jr., "Command Effectiveness and C³I," **Defense 83**, November 1983, p. 2ff.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, **On War**, translation by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 117.
6. Clausewitz, p. 85.
7. The conceptual foundation of this article evolved from three months of research conducted with Maj. Patrick Thornton at the Naval War College's Center for Advanced Research.

Maj. Brian L. Raymond is currently serving as the detachment commander of the United States Army Intelligence School, Devens Detachment at Pensacola, Florida. He has specialties in signals intelligence and public affairs. Raymond is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds an M.A. in English from the University of Virginia and an M.S. in Management from Salve Regina College. His military education includes the FA Officer Basic Course, the FA Officer Advanced Course, and the Naval War College. Previous assignments have included positions as an instructor, watch officer, battery commander, assistant brigade S4, company commander, S2, S3, aide-de-camp, and battery XO.

Throughout any military career there will be opportunities for commanders, officers, and senior NCOs to speak publicly: addressing the troops at opening formation; delivering a call to patriotism at a ceremonial occasion; or briefing top brass at a high-level strategy session. For the intelligence officer or NCO, the intelligence briefing is a staple of military life. For all our courage in fighting invading forces, however, we are often ill-prepared to do battle against a common and formidable foe: STAGE FRIGHT.

by John D. Saxon

THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFER: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO BETTER ORAL COMMUNICATION

Technically defined, "stage fright" is a normal and predictable form of emotional tension or anxiety occurring in anyone confronted with a situation in which the performance is important but the outcome uncertain. Simply put, it is a heightened concern over the quality, and consequences, of one's effort,[1] and could more properly be deemed "speech anxiety."

As an enemy of communicative effectiveness, it cannot be overestimated. Speech anxiety can cause knees to knock, hearts to race, limbs to perspire, mouths to go dry, and careers to crumble. It can turn the most promising situation into a formula for disaster. The word which is tripped on, the voice which doesn't project, the eyes which do not make contact, the succinct and insightful phrase which does not get remembered—all are casualties of an unseen, but easily conquered, adversary.

The key to overcoming speech anxiety for the intelligence briefer is as simple as it would appear trite: the right mental attitude. Having the right mental attitude, of course, can solve most human problems, from depression and marital difficulty to low worker productivity and urban alienation. It is easy to say that the right attitude can make the most frightened speaker into the most confident and eloquent. But it can, if commanders, officers, and senior NCOs will only remember, and put into practice these ten simple thoughts:

SOME ANXIETY IS BOTH NORMAL AND HEALTHY

Stage fright is not really fear, as we usually think of it, but anxiety. The speaker is not literally afraid of the situation or his audience; if the speaker fears anything, it is failure. There is, however, an existing level of anxiety which you **do not** want to get rid of; rather, you want to master it, control it, use its creative and beneficial properties to increase your effectiveness as a communicator.

Speech anxiety causes a number of physiological reactions which will actually improve your chances for success as a speaker. It triggers the release of adrenalin into one's system. Sugar is released into the bloodstream from reserves in the liver and insulin is released from the pancreas to convert that sugar into energy, thereby giving the body greater strength to cope. Breathing is quickened, which brings in oxygen and expels carbon dioxide at a more rapid pace. The pulse rate quickens so that more fresh blood arrives at the brain, heart, central nervous system, and muscles with larger quantities of oxygen.

It is important for speakers to realize just how beneficial the cumulative effect of these physiological changes can be. As Professor Bert Bradley of Auburn University describes it: "The brain is thus capable of thinking with greater clarity, greater perceptiveness and greater quickness; the muscles are capable of exerting a more intense physical effort, the central nervous system is capable of reacting more quickly. Because of these physiological changes, the human body can perform at a much higher level than under normal conditions."[2]

BREATHING PROPERLY CAN HELP YOU

Whenever you feel uptight or nervous, especially before you begin, take a couple of deep breaths, exhaling slowly and deliberately. If in the course of your remarks you stumble, make a mistake, or feel a surge of anxiety coming over you, take another deep breath and exhale slowly. Breathing properly can relax you and return your anxiety level to the lessened state where it works **for** you, not against you.

USE BODILY ACTION TO YOUR ADVANTAGE

The physiological changes in the body which are caused by speech anxiety often create excess energy. You can easily rid your body of such excess energy through the use of gestures and bodily movement. Such movement, however, should always be natural and appropriate for the situation. Otherwise, the movement will call attention to itself and detract from the message of the speaker.

YOU CONTROL THE SITUATION

Usually, you decide when you start and when you finish. You decide when, if at all, to pause, to gesture, to quote someone else, to tell a joke, to employ an analogy, to cite a statistic, or to seek to move an audience. You decide whether to use notes, read from a formal text, use a pointer or visual aid, or take questions. In fact, in most cases, you control what is said, or at least the specific points you want to cover, and in what detail and sequence.

Speaking to a group, even delivering an intelligence briefing, is the closest thing to a controlled environment you will encounter in everyday experience—if you approach it, if you just think of it, in such a way. Who can feel nervous when he or she is in complete control?

YOU ARE THE EXPERT

You are the one who has been invited to speak, selected to present the briefing, or chosen to command the troops. Most likely, in all but a few instances, you will know more about your subject for **that particular presentation** than anyone in the audience. **Anyone.** Otherwise, someone else would be making the presentation, not you! If you are the expert, what is there to fear?

PREPARATION WILL BUILD YOUR CONFIDENCE

Occasionally you will be called upon to speak or brief impromptu, in which case preparation is not possible. But that is the exception rather than the rule. If you are prepared, if you know your material, your confidence will soar and speech anxiety—save for that small reserve, the effect of which is salutary—will evaporate.

The more prepared, and, in turn, confident, you are, the less you will be tied to your notes or text, all the freer to establish eye contact with your audience. The more eye contact, the greater the visual bond and the more you feel **a part of**, rather than **apart from**, your audience. Needless to say, feeling a part of your audience is a natural way to lessen speech anxiety—and keep the interest of your audience in the process.

EVERYONE WANTS YOU TO SUCCEED

Put differently, and perhaps more importantly, **no one wants you to fail**. Remember the times you've been in an audience and the speaker lost his place in his notes, didn't know the answer to a question, or was struggling for the right word. You almost formed the word on your lips, maybe even whispered it to him. You wanted to help. You thought to yourself, "There but for the grace of God go I." And your reaction is usually shared by everyone in the audience.

So don't be embarrassed. Don't be nervous. You're human, you're going to stumble occasionally, and no one is going to laugh or humiliate you for being human. If you realize that everyone wants you to succeed, then you're on the road to overcoming speech anxiety for good by defeating the biggest enemy of effective public speaking: **fear of failure**.

GET AS MUCH EXPERIENCE AS POSSIBLE

Many people, succumbing to a normal tendency, shy away from opportunities to hone their speaking skills when, in fact, as with most of life's endeavors, speaking improves with experience. More importantly, experience breeds confidence, which is a strong antidote to the crippling effects of speech anxiety. So seek out opportunities not just to brief, but to speak, lecture, preside, or comment in general. You will be amazed at how quickly your confidence on your feet increases and, in turn, how speech anxiety actually becomes **a tool you use** to enhance your communicative effectiveness. You will be surprised at how quickly you become amazed that speech anxiety could ever have been a problem for you.

With public speaking, it isn't so much that practice makes perfect as it is **practice makes confident**, and confidence causes speech anxiety to evaporate.

DEVELOP A COMMUNICATIVE ATTITUDE

Above all, you must concentrate on communicating. You must develop and nurture an attitude in which communicating meaning to your audience is your uppermost goal. You must constantly ask yourself, not "How am I doing," but "Do these people **hear** me? Am I communicating my concern about, or interest in, this subject? Are they responding in ways I desire?"

If you concentrate on communicating **with** your audience (communicating **to** suggests a one-way process), then your failure to worry about speech anxiety will cause it to dissipate to a level at which it helps, rather than hurts, you. In short, if you're thinking about communicating with your audience you won't have time to think about being nervous.

IF YOU DO FAIL,
THE OUTCOME IS NEVER AS BAD AS YOU IMAGINE

If you've followed the above nine steps, failure to speak as effectively as possible is extremely unlikely. If, however, you do fail for some reason, the consequences are almost never as bad as you might have imagined.

Think worst case scenario: what can happen if you mispronounce a word, or forget one of your five points? In most cases, nothing. Sure if it's your once-in-a-lifetime chance to brief the commander in chief and you absolutely, totally, unquestionably blow it, your career could suffer. But the likelihood of a speaking situation in which the outcome is so important, and the performance so poor, is extremely remote. Even then, what would the president do? Summarily court-martial you on the spot? Of course not. So relax.

As a matter of fact, in most cases, your rhetorical **faux pas** will not be noticed by your audience. Scholarly studies in the speech communication field suggest that members of an audience tend to detect less speech disruption in the speaker than the speaker himself reports having experienced.

In sum, the right mental attitude is the key to overcoming speech anxiety. Doing so can improve your oral skills in general, and your briefing skills in particular, and hence your leadership effectiveness. And right mental attitude, rather than being an abstraction, is really attainable. It is a matter of remembering, and practicing the exercise of, 10 simple commandments:

- **Some anxiety is both normal and healthy.**
- **Breathing properly can help you.**
- **Use bodily action to your advantage.**
- **You control the situation.**
- **You are the expert.**
- **Preparation builds confidence.**
- **Everyone wants you to succeed**.
- **Get as much experience as possible. Practice makes confident.**
- **Develop a communicative attitude.**
- **Remember: if you fail, the outcome is never as bad as you might imagine.**

**Commit these principles to practice.
To serve in uniform is to speak.
To serve in Military Intelligence is to brief.
To speak well—
without fear of failure, without the hindrance of speech anxiety—
is to serve well. ★**

Footnotes

1. Bert Bradley, **Speech Performance**
(Dubuque: William C. Brown, Co. Publishers, 1971), p. 31.
2. Ibid., p. 35.

John D. Saxon, Director of Corporate Issues, RCA Corporation, is an MI captain, USAR, with the 12th Psychological Operations Company in Washington, D.C. He is a Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Alabama, from which he received his B.A. and J.D. degrees. Saxon received his M.A. in Speech Communication from the University of North Carolina, has taught undergraduate and graduate courses in speech communication at various universities and colleges, and has been a speech writer for, among others, Vice President Walter Mondale and Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.). In 1974 he toured New Zealand as a member of the two-man U.S. International Debate Team. His articles on speech communication have appeared in **Southern Speech Communication Journal, North Carolina Journal of Speech and Drama, Alabama Speech and Theater Journal,** *and* **Spectra**. *A former Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Ethics, in 1978 Saxon was named by President Carter as the youngest of 15 White House Fellows for 1978-79. A past president of the White House Fellows Association, and former chairman of the White House Fellows Foundation, in 1983 Saxon was appointed by President Reagan to the President's Commission on White House Fellowships.*

Ethics in Leadership

by SFC Walter K. Blankenship

When leadership is defined, specific mention is usually made to organizing and motivating people, and to pooling resources to accomplish the mission. There is, however, something implied in this definition that is usually not stated, probably because it is so obvious. In accomplishing any of these tasks, the leader must act consistently and exhibit certain values, such as honesty, respect for others, fairness, and justice. None of us would say that a person who accomplishes the mission by disregarding the welfare of subordinates, by lying or constantly intimidating those who work for him or her is exercising good leadership. Rather, good leadership is based on ethically appropriate methods. For this reason, ethics must be seen as a fundamental element of leadership, essential to a leader's training and development.

There are three sets of values that influence us as Army leaders: national, Army, and personal values. National values are values embodied in the U.S. Constitution, values which guarantee that every individual will be treated fairly and justly. It is for these basic values that we would come to the defense of our nation. We confirm our commitment to these values in the oath of enlistment when we swear to "support and defend the Constitution and bear true allegiance to the same." The citizens of our country demand our honesty, loyalty and commitment. They expect us to conduct ourselves in a manner which is above reproach. When we stray from these standards, we betray a public trust and undermine a relationship which is essential as the military fulfills its function for the nation.

Army values flow from national values. Fairness, justice, human worth, and human dignity are Army values as well as national values. FM 100-1 lists four values which make up the "Army Ethic." These are: loyalty to the institution; loyalty to the unit; personal responsibility; and selfless service. These principles guide us toward becoming good leaders. FM 100-1 also lists four qualities which the professional leader must possess: commitment, competence, candor, and courage. These are just a few of the values a leader must exhibit. If all of the values required of a sound ethical leader were listed, it would stagger the imagination.

Nevertheless, the values of an effective leader should not be applied in an inflexible manner. Any guideline, taken to the extreme, can create a very large problem, not only for oneself but for the entire unit as well. For example, an authoritarian leader demands obedience from subordinates. Although obedience is a very important value in the military, in some cases, absolute or blind obedience can lead to an unethical situation. Therefore, these values must be applied as guiding principles and not as hardfast, unwavering rules.

Personal values are values which an individual brings into the military. They are values which have been developed since childhood, and which probably influence an individual's decisions more than any other values. Personal values may include national

and Army values, but they alone have the greatest influence on the way an individual makes decisions. To thoroughly understand a person's values, one must first understand human nature. In this way, a leader can get to know his or her subordinates and learn what makes them take one action instead of another. Insight can be gained watching soldiers operate, taking note of how they react under stress. By placing soldiers in stressful situations one can observe how they think and resolve the problems which face them.

Many of our young soldiers may think ethics do not apply to them, that they are not the ones who make the decisions, that the "other guy" is the one who decides who does what and when. In actuality, everyone is involved in making the right or wrong decision long before entering the military. During childhood, each one of us must decide whether to obey or not to obey the laws and rules set down by society. Such decisions help define and develop values in the early years which an individual will later bring into the military. Once in a leadership position, these values, and the way in which they are applied, can affect the entire unit's way of thinking.

The ethical climate within a unit affects both leaders and subordinates. The ethical climate is closely related to the moral atmosphere within the unit. The climate can be positive or negative. Leaders can create a positive atmosphere by making the right decisions. If something is wrong, the leader must fix it. He or she cannot wait for the other guy to fix it or it might not get done at all. There must also be effective communication between superiors and subordinates. By talking and listening, solutions to problems often appear before problems arise. Too often, the leader wants to lead, but forgets to listen. This creates a negative atmosphere within the unit and leads to a lack of trust and confidence. Having that trust and confidence between junior officers and enlisted personnel is essential in promoting a positive atmosphere within any unit. Without it the unit will fall apart and fail to accomplish its mission. A leader must also recognize soldiers who do an outstanding job. Far too many times, the good soldiers are not recognized or remembered;

only the ones who make mistakes are remembered. If soldiers put in the extra time to get the job done right, the leader should let them know it. If they mess up, they must also be told; however, a leader does not hold a grudge.

People do not always demonstrate the values that are important to the Army as a whole. The values that people do demonstrate affect the unit as a whole, so it is important to create a positive atmosphere within the unit, not a negative one. Communication is the key.

During the AirLand Battle, the Army leader will have to make instantaneous decisions on a fast-moving battlefield. Our Army has traditionally taken pride in our soldiers' ability to "think on their feet" and react to changing circumstances. The key to being a good leader, whether officer or NCO, is being able to "think on your feet" and deciding if ethics is your business or the "other guy's." ★

SFC Walter K. Blankenship is a senior instructor/author with the Military Intelligence Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course, Enlisted Training Division, Department of Tactics, Intelligence and Military Science, USAICS. He entered the military in 1973 and has since completed two tours in Korea, one year at Ft. Hood, and a two-year tour in Holland at Allied Forces Central Europe. He has been an instructor/author with the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course since July 1982, He has completed the Noncommissioned Officers Academy and the NCO Advanced Course.

LEADERSHIP: THE WHOLE JOB

by Capt. Daniel F. Baker

Leadership is one of the great intangibles that is often cited as making the difference between a good unit and a poor one, a victorious army and a losing one. There are many leadership philosophies and definitions (and myths and misconceptions). Leadership characteristics and principles are precisely stated, and classes on leadership are a part of virtually every military school curriculum. Every day we judge the leadership of our superiors and subordinates and are evaluated on our own leadership. How do we identify the good leader and the poor one? What are the criteria? What makes leader "A" better than leader "B"? What does one do that the other does not?

The Army defines leadership as the "art of influencing people to accomplish a mission." By extension, this definition suggests that a *good* leader is a *successful* leader. This is certainly hard to deny. Unfortunately, this same definition can be, and often is, interpreted to mean that a *successful* leader is a *good* leader, a concept which has been disproven on countless occasions. We all have known a lousy leader who consistently got the job done—a successful leader who was *not* a good leader.

That leadership be judged by results is not only unavoidable but absolutely necessary; that success is the sole standard by which leadership is evaluated, however, is wrong. Success and failure are good measurements of the effectiveness of leadership but

are not adequate by themselves to gauge the quality of leadership. A good leader must, by definition, accomplish the mission; but he or she must also do more. "What else is there?" a successful leader might ask. The good leader would answer, "There are the *people*."

An officer or NCO with a mission to accomplish is an action officer or an action NCO. The same individual with a mission, and with the soldiers to accomplish it, becomes a leader. However, a good leader cannot separate the mission and the people; a good leader accomplishes the mission *and* takes care of his or her people.

"Taking care of soldiers" is a much used and often misunderstood expression. Too many leaders translate it into coddling or babying the soldiers. They believe it means that leaders should bend the rules for their soldiers, ignore their minor infractions or lapses, promote them quickly,and give them as much extra time off as possible.

Leaders who accept this interpretation are split into two groups—those who practice it and those who refute the entire concept. Leaders who attempt to apply this interpretation usually find themselves dependent upon the good will of their soldiers to accomplish the mission. They compromise the mission and their own or the Army's standards. Leaders who refute this concept point to the practice of coddling the soldiers as erod-

ing discipline and effectiveness and dismiss "taking care of soldiers" as being counterproductive. They refuse to acknowledge any obligation except the mission. While each of these groups may have its *successful* leaders, it is unlikely that either of the two groups has *good* leaders, because neither group addresses the entire job of leadership. These two factions are the disputants in the great debate on whether the priority should be "people first" or "mission first"—a debate that is rooted in the misinterpretation of leadership responsibilities.

If taking care of soldiers is not catering to them, then what is it? It is a commitment on the part of a leader to do what is *right*—for the mission, for the soldier, and for the Army. This is not a terribly complex task because these are not divergent elements. Neither of these can exist without the other two. A leader should never find himself or herself faced with an absolute choice; the situation should not arise when a leader must choose what is right for one at the complete expense of the remaining two. All three are integrally related and the conficts that arise must be resolved by finding the best course of action.

A leader is charged with making decisions and he or she must take all factors into consideration if the best decision is to be made. The narrow focus of "mission only or soldier only" may result in an adequate decision, but rarely the best one. The best solu-

tion accomplishes the mission, meets the soldier's needs, and satisfies the requirements of the Army.

Certainly, there are situations when it may not be possible to come up with a course of action that does all of these things; when those infrequent situations arise, the mission must come first. Our soldiers understand this. A good leader does not demand sacrifices from his or her soldiers unless they are necessary. The poor leader, on the other hand, uses the soldiers' sacrifices as an easy alternative to the difficult work of finding the best, the *right*, course of action.

Finding the right course of action and taking care of soldiers is work. It requires time, effort, knowledge, and experience. It is not enough that the leader be tactically and technically proficient and fully understand the mission; he or she must be equally familiar with the soldiers who perform the job. The leader must know the soldiers' strengths and weaknesses, their goals and aspirations, and their anxieties and frustrations. How else can he or she do what is *right*? Learning all of this requires exertion on the part of the leader; it cannot be picked up by osmosis or acquired easily. The fact is that it requires time, effort, and study, and is just as much a part of the leader's job as learning the technical aspects of the mission.

To know soldiers, a leader does not have to (and should not) become their best friend or pal. A leader should

be considered a friend, in the sense that he or she has the soldiers' trust and respect. A good leader knows his or her soldiers well enough to tell when something is bothering one of them, and then will find out what's wrong and try to help. Good leaders demonstrate their concern for soldiers by taking action, not by waiting for the soldiers to come to them with problems or by waiting until the problem has grown serious enough to require official attention.

By demonstrated interest and concern, a leader can earn the trust of his or her soldiers. Then begins the real test of the good leader—keeping the trust and building a strong relationship that characterizes our very best units. That relationship is one of mutual confidence and respect among all the members of the team. There is unity of purpose and an understanding, by every member, of each individual's contribution to the purpose. The goal is *esprit de corps* in its purest form and is not achievable without good leadership. A leader is the key person in a high performance organization. Without the leader's understanding and respect for each member's role and without his or her confidence in the members, group excellence cannot be realized. Similarly, without the subordinates' understanding of a leader's role and confidence in his or her abilities and dependability, the goal is unattainable.

While knowing the soldiers and being genuinely concerned for them is essential, it is only one of the ingredients that a leader must contribute to the organization. To fully create the atmosphere that will promote excellence, a leader must establish the behavior model for the organization. His or her personal philosophy is the norm for the organization, and it is imperative that this standard be carefully thought out and pursued. The leader really must "set the example."

All the tried and true catch phrases concerning leadership are valid and deserve more than lip service. Integrity, selflessness, fairness, and loyalty are leadership traits that cannot be evaluated on a *go/no-go* basis. They translate into observable conduct that is constantly being judged by the soldiers. Part of the leader's responsibility to take care of soldiers is the obligation to transmit these values to them. The "Do as I say, not as I do" leader is a poor leader because he or she fails to set an example.

Integrity and honesty mean much more than not lying and not stealing pencils; they constitute a moral imperative which compels the leader to always try to do what is *right*. The good leader does not do things for the sake of appearance or to cover his or her tracks; the good leader does things because they should be done. Soldiers can easily tell the difference in motivation. The good leader's consistent honesty is the basis for the continuing trust and respect received from his or her subordinates. The knowledge that the leader will always try to do what is *right* (for the mission, for the soldier, and for the Army) gives the soldiers confidence in the leader's decision. They willingly make the sacrifices this leader asks of them because they are certain the sacrifices are necessary.

Selflessness is the willingness to make personal sacrifices in order to get the job, the whole job, done. Lack of selflessness is apparent in two different attitudes. On one hand, there is the leader who is anxious about who gets the "credit" for accomplishing the mission, because he or she is concerned with personal career advancement; success is this leader's goal. On the other hand, there is the leader who finishes the task and wants a break, who does not want to be burdened with taking care of the people too. Both these leaders fail to satisfy the requirements of selflessness, even if they do both work many extra hours to finish the task. Both are selfish, although for different reasons, and both fail to do what is *right*.

Fairness, loyalty, and a host of other good leadership traits are similarly tied to a leader's obligation to his or her soldiers. The group's discipline begins with the self-discipline of the leader. The leaders set the standards, but they must also meet those standards before they can legitimately enforce them. High standards not only mark a good leader, but so does the consistency with which he or she applies them and personally lives up to them.

A leader is subject to constant scrutiny—everything from the shine on boots to the speed and thoroughness of handling problems. Everything about a leader is subject to analysis and interpretation. A good leader is not bothered by this scrutiny because he or she lives up to the standards as a matter of routine. A leader's adherence to the standards validates them for the group and helps give him or her the informal leadership, as well as the formal leadership, of the group. A leader's compromise in any area, on the other hand, is immediately detected by soldiers and results in a corresponding lowering of group standards and a reduction in confidence in the leader.

That "leaders are born, not made" is a widely held belief that is subject to dispute. The so-called "natural" leader is really only a person with concern for people and a highly developed sense of obligation to do what is *right*. Natural leadership and acquired leadership require the same amount of work—the natural leader cannot take care of soldiers any faster or with any less effort than anyone else.

It is the individual who decides whether he or she will become a good leader or a poor one. A person is not a poor leader because he or she was born that way. Generally poor leaders earn their reputation because they are too selfish or too lazy to do what they know is *right*. Poor leaders usually know what they ought to do; they simply fail to do it.

By way of example, Pvt. Jones is a good soldier whose performance has deteriorated over the previous week. Sgt. Smith knows he should stay after work and talk to Jones. But if he does that, he will miss the football game on TV, or maybe he suspects the problem requires a lot of effort to solve and he feels he has too much work now. Smith leaves work feeling uncomfortable, but convinced it is all right because if the problem is important it will surface again later. Besides, he rationalizes, it might be personal and he does not want to interfere. He goes home and by the middle of the first quarter of the game, Jones has been forgotten and the guilt has passed.

But the guilt was there, so the seed of good leadership is also there. The good leader simply understands what has to be done and does not ignore the guilt that accompanies an incomplete job, especially when the part not done concerns people.

In the final analysis, it is the old faithful "Golden Rule" that comes into play: Are leaders doing for soldiers what leaders expect or want their leaders, in turn, to do for them? Are leaders trying to meet soldiers' needs, satisfy their ambitions, and reduce their frustrations? Are leaders doing their share, their jobs as leaders—leadership work—or are they doing time, 20 years, like prison sentences to be completed with as little tribulation as possible. Are leaders doing what is *right*— for the mission,

for the soldier, and for the Army—or are they just making noise? Do leaders speak of patriotism, of the sacrifices they make and are prepared to make, and then loudly proclaim each mission success while at the same time failing to take the extra time to do the job completely? Yes, leadership is the difference between a good unit and a poor one, between a victorious army and a losing one. And good leadership can be learned, developed, and improved.

"Be all that you can be" is much more than an advertising slogan—it is an exhortation to each leader. Today's recruits enter the Army believing that slogan and they have high expectations. Yes, they enter for a variety of reasons—for patriotism, for vocational training, for travel, for experience— and they expect their leaders to satisfy those goals. At the same time, they expect, and are entitled to, a fulfilling and rewarding experience in the service of their country. These soldiers are bright, ambitious, and patriotic, and they want to be all they can be. They intend to meet their superiors' expectations, and superiors are obliged to meet theirs. To allow soldiers to be all they can be, to reach their full potential, requires good leadership. Leaders must be the best they can be. We have to do the whole job of leadership; we must accomplish the mission *and* take care of the soldiers. We must do what is *right*— for the mission, for the soldiers, and for the Army. ★

Capt. Daniel Baker is currently assigned to the U.S. Army Field Station, Sinop, Turkey, where he is the assistant operations officer and the OIC of the Hippodrome Data Collection and Analysis Facility. Baker previously commanded signal security detach-ments at Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Division and Headquarters, VII Corps, and was operations officer of the 201st ASA company in Augsberg, Germany. While assigned to Fort Huachuca, Baker served as an instructor in the Department of Human Intelligence, was aide-de-camp to the school commandant, and commanded the school brigade's Company D. Baker is a graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course and the Combined Arms and Service Staff School.

USAICS Notes

★ ★

Change of Command

Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr. receives colors and command of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School from Gen. William R. Richardson, Commander, TRADOC.

Maj. Gen. Julius Parker, Jr. took command of the United States Army Intelligence Center and School from Maj. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein during a change of command ceremony on August 2, 1985 at Fort Huachuca, Az.

Maj. Gen. Weinstein served as the first Proponent and Chief of Military Intelligence Branch. When he took command in August 1982, Maj. Gen. Weinstein brought a vision of excellence to the Intelligence Center and School. In three short years, that vision has become a reality. He inspired his Soldiers and civilians to demand excellence in all of the Intelligence Center's training, doctrine, and development activities. The results of these efforts are the best

trained Military Intelligence Soldiers the Army has ever seen, a solid doctrinal foundation defining intelligence support to the AirLand Battle, and the most ambitious fielding and development of tactical intelligence materiel and organizations. Maj. Gen. Weinstein turned the Intelligence Center and School into the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's recognized Center of Excellence.

During the change of command ceremony, Maj. Gen. Weinstein was frocked to the rank of lieutenant general. After his departure from the Intelligence Center and School, Lt. Gen. Weinstein assumed his new duties as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

Maj. Gen. Parker was born April 14, 1935 in New Braunfels, Texas. He graduated from Prairie View A&M University with a bachelor of science degree in biology and chemistry. Maj. Gen. Parker received an ROTC commission in the Infantry upon completion of his undergraduate studies. He has since earned a master's degree in public administration from Shippensburg State College.

Between 1956 and 1967, Maj. Gen. Parker completed five successive tours in Infantry. During those years, he was assigned to the 6th Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 4th Infantry divisions, Headquarters, VII Corps, and Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command.

Maj. Gen. Parker went to Vietnam in 1968 and served as the senior district advisor to the Duc Thanh District, Sa Dec province. He returned to the United States in 1969 to perform duties as a combat intelligence staff officer, ground surveillance officer, and branch chief in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence on the Army staff until 1972. He then commanded the 165th MI Battalion, 66th MI Group until 1973.

Maj. Gen. Parker's next assignment was as the assistant chief of staff, intelligence, 2d Armored Division. He later attended the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. Upon graduation, he was retained as a faculty member and strategic analyst in the Strategic Studies Institute until 1977.

Maj. Gen. Parker's first brigade-level command was the 501st MI Brigade. He successfully organized and integrated four intelligence units to form the Army's first multidisciplined brigade-level intelligence organization. He commanded the 501st until 1979. Maj. Gen. Parker then returned to the Army staff to serve as the executive officer to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. There he was selected for promotion to brigadier general.

At Fort McPherson, Ga., Maj. Gen. Parker assumed the position of deputy chief of staff for intelligence. Here he initiated the development of a program to use computers to perform intelligence functions at army, corps, and division levels. In 1981, Maj. Gen. Parker was assigned to Europe as the deputy chief of staff for intelligence where he supervised the reorganization and conversion of MI units to combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) battalion and group structures. He later became the deputy director for management and operations, Defense Intelligence Agency, where he was assigned until his present appointment.

During nearly 30 years of service, Maj. Gen. Parker has received many awards, including the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star for Valor with Oak Leaf Cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, the Purple Heart, Combat Infantryman's Badge, and the Parachutist Badge.

Maj. Gen. Parker and his wife Dorothy have two sons and a daughter, Lt. Julian R. Parker, Jules G. Parker, and Dorvita J. Parker.

USAISD Notes

Electronic Warfare Analyst Course

by Sgt. Glenda F. Dezelan-Olson

Once upon a time, I was a new soldier just entering the wonderful world of tactical intelligence. I felt confident of my abilities. In fact, I had just finished a course at Fort Devens, Ma., (232-F3) which was an add-on course for soldiers heading for European tactical assignments. However, upon reporting to my first unit, I was dismayed! Nothing I had been taught in class prepared me for duties in a tactical unit. I quickly discovered that the majority of my instruction had been slanted toward strategic personnel. People around me talked in some unknown language. "OK, get to the motor pool and pull PMCS on your deuce." No problem, right? Well, I had just found out two days before that a deuce was a truck, not a playing card. Well, let's just say a situation such as this confuses a new troop and provides a good laugh for the gaining unit.

I used the motor pool as one example, but there are many others: putting up tents that don't fall down; knowing the elementary rule of camouflaging; the fine art of placing concertina wire without including my body as a permanent part of the perimeter; and the joys of guard duty on a crisp (crisp equates to frozen eyebrows) German morning.

With so much to learn, the days went by quickly. Soon, we were ready to go to the field and set up to perform a mission. Finally, I thought, "I can put some of my classroom studies to practical use." What a dreamer! There was, I have learned, a ritual for going to the field—beginning with the 'alert.' I'm fairly bright (or so I had thought up to this point) so I knew 'alert' meant "a warning" or "to be watchful." Alert—at four o'clock in the morning? Was this a joke? No, it was reality—I had to grab my TA-50 (another new term, by the way), dash to my duty section, receive a card that outlined my duties, load up, and move out at a frantic pace. A grand experience, one that became quite rou-

tine, but it would have been nice to have heard about it prior to going through it. Then it came to setting up field operations. Where were the heated buildings, I wondered? Where were all the nifty supplies we used in our school environment? Working aids? What working aids? Put fuel in the generator? Sure, just point me to the fuel point and the generator, then show me where the fuel is supposed to go. Afterwards, I was really in trouble—I was sent to check the light kit for a 'pig-tail'!

After all that, I did survive my tactical assignment.

Now . . . well, I am presently working as an instructor preparing students for tactical assignments. Our particular course, the eight week Electronic Warfare Analyst Course (EWAC), was written with today's soldier in mind. I am fortunate to have been involved in the research and writing of this new course of instruction geared toward tactical assignments, along with many other soldiers who have suffered tactical pains.

In the first part of this article, I approached the subject in a humorous manner. However, I feel it points out a few of the problems facing a soldier during a first tactical assignment. It also shows that a poorly trained soldier can complicate the lives of supervisors and commanders.

These problems have since been identified. Consequently, more complete classes are being presented to students. EWAC trains students to live and operate in the field with trucks, generators, shelters, tents, and camouflage. These are elements of the field 98C soldiers will need to be familiar with to accomplish the mission. Communications operations, procedures, and equipment training are an integral part of the course. In addition to learning these soldier skills, tactical analysts are trained to sort through a dense target environment, select productive targets, perform basic analysis, and identify items

of intelligence value in a timely and accurate manner in support of the commander's PIR and IR.

Regardless of how adequate you think training or instruction may be, practical application is the best teacher. Therefore, each class is involved in a six-day Field Training Exercise (FTX) which affords the student-soldiers an excellent opportunity to use their knowledge and skills in a "real world" environment. They set up and operate a Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE), enabling them to fuse all the analytic skills they have learned. While working in the TCAE, the students rotate through various duties from MOS-specific duties such as posting the map-board, reporting, and managing assets, to general duties such as radio operations and perimeter defense.

By completion of the FTX, students have gained confidence in their new abilities and are prepared for what to expect as a tactical analyst. This new course allows for continuous advancement in training to meet changing requirements of commanders and the intelligence community. Plans have already been made for the implementation of training on MICROFIX, a data flow system, and the Technical Control and Analysis Center in FY 86.

As evidenced by this new course, great strides have been taken by instructors, school personnel, and administrators in providing realistic training for students. Our graduates can proceed to future duty assignments with the ability and knowledge required to become assets to their gaining units.

The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. John A. Wickham Jr., visited Fort Devens for the first time on May 9. Included in his visit was a tour of the Electronic Warfare Operators Course of the Intelligence School, Devens. (From left, Sgt. Steven Schulz, USAISD, and 1st Lt. David Clarke, USAISD, brief Gen. John A. Wickham Jr. on the operation of the AN/GLQ-3B Countermeasures System.)

O'Neil building

O'Neil Hall was recently dedicated in a Fort Deven's area that will eventually become the tactical training area for all courses taught there. O'Neil Hall will specifically be used for training soldiers to become electronic repair technicians.

O'Neil Hall is the first of several planned construction projects for Fort Devens. Three more projects will be constructed between fiscal years 1989 and 1994.

Two buildings make up O'Neil Hall with the larger of the two buildings used for equipment instruction of the tactical electronic warfare signals intelligence equipment repairer courses. This building houses four maintenance bays to accommodate tactical vehicles and their systems. There are also outdoor pads for tactical equipment. The smaller of the two buildings will be used for administrative offices.

The building was dedicated in honor of Thomas R. O'Neil, an instructor at the Fort Devens Intelligence School for 15 years. He also spent 21 years in the Army intelligence field before serving as an instructor. O'Neil's widow, Aphrodite, performed the ceremonial ribbon cutting with the help of Col. Joseph F. Short, ISD Commander. "He left a mark on maintenance training which provides a standard for all to strive to attain," said Short during the dedication ceremony.

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Military Intelligence

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For more information, contact the editor by writing to Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 85613-7000; or call Autovon 879-2676/3266, or commercial (602) 538-2676/3266.

Branch Notes

MI Lieutenant Training

This fiscal year, 337 lieutenants will come into the Military Intelligence Branch. That figure breaks down into 250 men and 87 women. Sixty-one percent of those new officers will be accepted in a Regular Army status. Once on active duty, the education and professional development of new officers is a prime concern for the MI Branch. MI Branch receives a limited number of airborne and Ranger school quotas each fiscal year. These are available on a volunteer basis. Annually the branch averages approximately 150 airborne quotas and 20 Ranger school slots, making this training competitive. These quotas are for all ranks and include officers leaving the MI Officer Basic Course, those going to the MI Officer Advanced Course, and those en route to new assignments.

It should be understood that officers no longer can receive training coming from the advanced course to their next assignments unless specifically requested by the gaining unit. This policy is in accordance with Army Chief of Staff directives to reduce the number of Army captains in the transient, holding, and the student accounts. Those officers scheduled for MIOAC and desiring Ranger and/or airborne training should coordinate with their MI Branch career manager so that they receive such training before reporting to Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

MI Branch cannot send officers to the Special Forces Qualifications Course (SFQC) or the Defense Language Institute simply to educate an officer. Language training and SFQC are awarded because the job to which the officer has been assigned *requires that specific training*. There are five lieutenant jobs that require language training (three Spanish, two Italian), and these are three year tours. As officers are promoted during their careers, more jobs require this type of training, but again keep in mind that these jobs are extremely competitive. Availability is a key factor.

We have resumed assigning a *limited* number of lieutenants into the four Special Forces groups of the 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Requests for assignment will be processed on a case-by-case basis until approximately September 1986. At that time, the Special Operations Warrant Officer Program will be capable of providing the required support to SOCOM. Breaks in stabilization may be approved for officers stationed in CONUS that are designated for a SOCOM assignment. However, for officers assigned overseas, curtailment requests will be refused.

MI lieutenants who wish to volunteer for Special Forces training and duty must meet the following requirements.

• Must be a 1st lieutenant as of the projected reporting date to SOCOM and for a period of 12 months after (not including the five-month qualification course).
• Must have 18 months experience in his basic branch serving with a TOE unit.
• Must meet the requirements as defined in AR 614-162 (if not already ASI 5G qualified).
• Must have the endorsement of the command to which the officer is assigned.

Officers designated for Special Operations training and assignments will be sent to the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., for a period of five months to attend the Special Operations Detachment Officer Qualifications Course. Upon successful completion of the qualification course, the officer will be assigned into one of the four Special Forces groups. Interested officers should consult with their battalion adjutants and submit their requests under the provisions of AR 614-162. Questions should be directed to Capt. John Custer at MI Branch.

MI and the New OPMS

As outlined in the October 1984 edition of **Commanders Call**, the revised Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) will change the current dual specialty system to one in which officers will be managed, developed, and promoted by branch and/or functional area. The revised OPMS will affect many facets of our current system.

One major change will be the consolidation of multiple specialties into a single branch. For the intelligence community, this equates to converting specialty codes 35, 36, and 37 to "areas of concentration" within the MI Branch. Under the new system, it is envisioned that many MI officers will single track within the MI Branch, although many MI officers currently hold dual intelligence specialties (i.e 35/37, 36/35). Other MI officers will be developed in a functional area by either dual or sequential tracking, after receiving a firm foundation in intelligence assignments.

Many of the officers who have proceeded under the current OPMS (senior captains and field grade officers) will be grandfathered if they are considered equally qualified in both of their currently held specialties. For example, an officer who holds specialties 35 and 53, and is determined to be qualified in both, will retain those specialties. Officers designated and qualified in specialties 35 and 36, or 37 and 35, probably will single track in MI Branch as they are doing now and retain classification code 35. They can expect to be assigned to jobs which correspond to their MI qualifications (i.e. 35A/E/F or 35A/D/E), or they will receive training en route to prepare them for assignment in the new area of concentration. Officers not qualified in their currently designated additional specialty may be afforded an opportunity to single track and serve in only a functional area, as their qualifications and Army requirements permit. Some officers currently holding specialties in two branches and qualified in both may retain both or be designated into a single area concentration within the second branch.

As part of the transition process, individual qualifications will be reviewed and the desires of the offi-

cers affected will be solicited before a decision is made on reclassification. An officer's current assignment, as well as any projected assignment, may have significant impact on the officer's qualifications and development strategy under the revised OPMS. Professional development decisions now must consider both the officer's qualifications under the dual specialty system and how to ease transition into the revised system. These decisions are important for senior captains and majors who have time available for little more than two three-year assignments and some professional development schooling before entering the primary zone for 05. Ideally, these assignments would include one tactical and one strategic tour and/or one INSPEC and one ADSPEC assignment.

Currently any additional specialty utilization or training must be evaluated in light of the revised OPMS. Officers must ask themselves (and their assignment officer) how much an assignment supports the revised OPMS transition. Every MI officer should be familiar with the professional development implications of the revised system, and how these affect the MI Branch and the individual. He or she should then develop a personal transition strategy toward a professional goal.

DA Selection Boards

For most officers, selection for promotion, service schools, and to a lesser degree, command, is an important and desirable goal. However, for most officers, the actual operation of a Department of the Army selection board is clouded in a strange mystique. Because of a lack of understanding of the procedural process by which boards operate, some officers are not aware of the positive influence they can exert to enhance chances for selection.

Promotion boards consist of at least five active Army officers. Board members must be at least O4 in rank, with all board members outranking the officers being considered. Additionally, there will be at least one officer representing each branch competing on the promotion board.

There are two types of boards: fully-qualified and best-qualified. The captains board, the first centralized board in an officer's career, is the only fully-qualified board; for example, the maximum number of officers to be selected equals the number of officers above and in the zone. A fully qualified officer is one who demonstrates the requisite professional skills and the necessary character traits to perform successfully at the next higher grade. All other promotion boards, as well as service school and command boards, are best-qualified boards. This means that some fully qualified officers will not be recommended for promotion.

Officers frequently ask what records a board actually reviews. The officer's board file, couched in a manila folder, consists of three things: the official photo, Officer Record Brief, and the performance microfiche. A vote sheet is stapled to the outside of the folder.

The photo, which is loose inside the folder, is the first item a board member sees. The board member will look at overall appearance, then check for details like proper wear of insignia and awards. The benefits of having a good photo make it worthwhile to have your uniform pressed, hair cut, and shoes shined. Finally, be sure to check the photograph before it is sent to MILPERCEN. If it is not a good photo, have it retaken. A photo is required within 60 days after promotion to 1st lieutenant and every four years thereafter. MI branch recommends that photos provided to promotion boards be no more than 18 months old. A sharp photo helps form a sharp impression.

The ORB is stapled to the inside of the folder so that only the top line is visible when the file is closed. Prior to all promotion boards (except O3) the local MILPO will ask each eligible officer, above, in and below the zone, to do an audit of his/her ORB. Pen and ink corrections are made by the officer, who then signs and dates the ORB in the remarks section. The MILPO chief acts as the verification authority and also signs his/her name. The audit ORB is then forwarded directly to a special processing section at MILPERCEN and is the actual ORB in your board file. For all other boards—service schools, command, captains—there is no audit ORB. Officers should contact their branch manager or the professional development officer directly if an error

exists. Be prepared to submit substantiating documentation. Your branch manager/professional development officer will pen and ink validated corrections in your board file. This procedure also applies to any last minute additional changes which need to be made to the audit ORB for a promotion board. The following are critical entries on the ORB deserving special attention: specialty codes; date of rank to present grade; military education level; civilian education level; updated physical data (every five years); height/weight data; and understandable duty titles.

The last item a board will review is the performance fiche, which is placed in the pocket inside the folder. This fiche contains all OERs and AERs, awards orders and citations, authorized commendatory letters, certificates of completion, and disciplinary data. Disciplinary records are not restricted. Any document not reaching MILPERCEN in time to be placed on the fiche is sent to the board and included in board files as "loose paper." Normally, the suspense for any document or correction to the ORB reaching MILPERCEN is the convening date of the board.

Regarding OER submission, a cutoff date or thru date for all OERs is identified in a message to the MILPOs announcing the board. A complete-the-record OER is authorized for officers in the primary zone of a promotion board only if the officer has never received a rating in his or her position and has held the position for 180 days or longer. A complete-the-record OER is certainly not mandatory; the need for such an OER varies from one officer to the next, depending on the officer's previous manner of performance and the time elapsed since the last OER. A complete-the-record OER is not authorized for below the zone candidates, for service school boards, or for command boards.

Board members look at every OER/AER in an officer's file. Members frequently place more emphasis on recent reports and reports covering those positions they consider critical, for example, command, brigade S2, and battalion S3. Officers frequently ask what part of an OER is most important. Board after-action reports have indicated that the complete OER

should be digested at once to form an overall impression of the officer's performance. However, when taken bit by bit, boards say that the most important parts are, in descending order: the senior rater's portion (both narrative and profile), the rater's portion on promotion potential, and the rater's comments on duty performance. A board will also look at the duty title and description, length of time of the report, type of report, continuity of rating when the officer is rated or senior rated by the same officer more than once, and trends in performance. It is important to ensure the correctness of the administrative data, to include PT score and height/weight data. Feedback from the board members indicates that an officer should concentrate on performing each job as well as he or she possibly can. An officer's manner of performance is the single most important discriminator in the selection process.

A final document authorized for placement in a board file is a letter to the president of the board. A letter to the president should be used only as a last resort and only if there is new information not in a file. The letter should be short and concise. It will be screened by the recorder to ensure that the material being offered is authorized for entry. Individual officers play an important role in determining the appearance of a board file. As a career manager, it is necessary to present the most complete and accurate board file possible. Board members can only judge by what they see.

Upcoming board schedules may be obtained from MI Branch.

Officers Notes

Conditional Voluntary Indefinite

by Micheal A. Lansing

The newly-implemented centralized Conditional Voluntary Indefinite (CVI) selection process raises new challenges for commanders in the professional development of other than Regular Army (OTRA) officers. Unlike Regular Army officers who remain in a career status as long as they are competitive for promotion, OTRA officers must compete for voluntary indefinite status.

The first step in obtaining career status is selection by the CVI centralized selection board. This board, consisting of a representative from each of the combat, combat support, and combat service support branches, is convened to select only the best OTRA officers for continuance on active duty. Unlike lieutenant and captain promotion boards, which select officers on a fully qualified basis, the CVI selection board uses criteria geared toward the selection of only the best qualified officers. This distinct difference in selection criteria makes the OTRA officer's early documented duty performance critical.

It is imperative that all commanders fully understand the CVI process, the criteria for selection, and the importance of the initial and subsequent OERs to OTRA officers. Failure to understand the importance of the CVI process may deny a deserving young officer the opportunity to further develop on active duty. To apply for CVI consideration, officers must meet certain minimum requirements and be willing to make some tough choices to obtain career status.

More importantly, the officer must state a willingness to accept a branch transfer as part of the awarding of CVI status. During professional development counseling, commanders should explain to their OTRA officers that the rebranching of junior grade officers is necessary to meet officer requirements at the captain and field grade levels. Of course, those officers wanting to volunteer for branch transfer to underaligned branches should

be encouraged to state their desires on their CVI applications.

A separate Department of the Army board is convened to determine required branch transfers. This board chooses a proportional number of top, middle, and lower third officers from the CVI selection results to enter underaligned branches. Therefore, it is imperative that commanders tell Reserve officers that even the top performers may be chosen for mandatory rebranching. Subsequently, it is vital that all officers give careful consideration before indicating their preferences for branch transfers. The choice may have long term consequences. The recently released CVI results clearly demonstrate the board's highly competitive nature. Only 78 percent of the officers were selected for retention, and in some branches the selection rate was as low as 59 percent. Those officers not selected for retention will have to separate within 90 days of written notification or at the end of their initial obligated tour, whichever is later. Officers must understand that there are no regulatory provisions for appeals or reconsideration, unless there is a positive material change to their Official Military Personnel File. In addition, active duty extensions will not be granted pending results of a request for reconsideration or awaiting the outcome of an OER appeal.

Once an OTRA officer has been selected for CVI status, commanders should know that the first year is a probationary period. In addition to incurring a one year active duty service obligation, the OTRA officer is on probation. To the commander, this means that any misconduct, failure at an Army-sponsored school, or downturn in duty performance is reason for revocation of CVI status. If CVI status is revoked during the probationary period, the officer will separate from active duty within 90 days.

The Army demands high standards of performance from all its officers—RA and OTRA. The CVI selection

process is one tool the commander uses to ensure that only the best qualified OTRA officers are permitted to serve on active duty in a career status. Acts of misconduct, integrity issues, and failure to meet PT and height and weight standards are obvious discriminators. However, commanders must ensure that officers who are slow to develop, but show potential for future service, have their duty performance documented in such a way as to clearly indicate the officer's potential. In light of the CVI board's competitive nature, OERs designed to "get an officer's attention" will likely deny him continued active duty.

The CVI process is the most competitive process a junior officer currently faces. A commander with a complete understanding of the process and its impact on achieving career status will have met the command challenge of mentor and coach. To do otherwise is a disservice to our quality OTRA officers.

Enlisted Notes

New PSYOP field

by Jerry Steelman

The Army plans to open a new enlisted military occupational specialty this year which will give soldiers in the psychological operations field a better chance at promotion and career advancement in addition to more specialized training.

The new PSYOP specialty, MOS 96F, was approved Feb. 17, 1984. It is scheduled for implementation Oct. 1, 1985 for both active Army and Reserve Component personnel. Advanced individual training for the new MOS, as well as higher-level skill training, will be conducted both by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Psychological operations positions are currently filled by soldiers from selected military occupational specialties who have attended the four-week PSYOP course at Fort Bragg and have received the "W" special qualification identifier.

At the present time, once a tour of duty in a PSYOP unit has been completed, the identifier may be dropped or replaced, making course graduates hard to identify for future PSYOP assignments. However, the new MOS is expected to improve personnel management and, therefore, make better use of training money by reducing the need to constantly retrain soldiers for PSYOP positions.

Other advantages are that PSYOP personnel will now receive job-specific training and will be able to compete for promotion without having to leave the PSYOP field. Also, they will be competitive with their contemporaries within career management field 96.

Modular training, including supervised on-the-job training and correspondence courses, is also planned to allow Reserve Component personnel to become MOS qualified without the difficulty of attending resident courses.

MOS qualification for reservists currently takes from two to four years since they must take the resident course piecemeal during annual training. The use of modular training is expected to reduce qualification time and meet requirements for mobilization. Reserve personnel currently account for 76 percent of the Army's PSYOP manpower.

Army personnel who have the "W" identifier on their MOS are eligible to apply now for reclassification into the new field so that processing can be completed prior to Oct. 1.

Those interested in reclassification should contact the Department of the Army Military Personnel Center, ATTN: DAPC-EPL-M, 2641 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, Va. 22331, for active duty personnel; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, ATTN: DAAR-PE, Washington, D.C., for Reserve Component personnel; or Commander, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, ATTN: ATSU-SI-DT, Fort Bragg, N.C., 28307-5000 (AV 236-9172, MSgt. Larry Coleman).

repeated by different means in his "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" beginning in 1966 which took an additional seven million lives. From 1926 until 1945, Mao had generally been more selective in his application of terrorism toward his enemies, while concurrently demanding the strictest code of discipline by his guerrillas and main forces in dealing with the civilian populace. It was this combination of actual or implied terrorism against the class enemy and highly disciplined "protectionism" of the masses by Mao's Chinese Communist People's Liberation Army which consolidated the mainland under the CPC absolute rule. Mao's strategy is a subject which requires detailed and careful study. It only worked fully in China. Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh successfully applied portions of it. Today, the New People's Army is attempting to apply the base area concept (rather than the hitherto unsuccessful Huk "production point" technique) and is conducting "Sparrow Warfare" with three-man "hit-teams" in Philippine urban areas.

Maj. John S. Arvidson
USAR

PROFESSIONAL READER

Inside Soviet Military Intelligence by Viktor Suvorov, New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1984, 193 pages, $15.95.

Throughout history all nations have resorted to espionage in an attempt to learn their enemies' military and political secrets. Today, there is nothing surprising about the fact that the Soviets engage in espionage. The major activities of the *Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye* (GRU) involve espionage techniques with objectives that are plainly offensive and totally militarily oriented. To achieve its goals, the Soviet Union has created the most extensive intelligence organization known—the GRU.

The GRU, the Soviet Military Intelligence, controls a network rarely understood in the West. Until recently, Western intelligence experts were only permitted fleeting glimpses into the machinations of this dark and shadowy apparatus. Defectors and emigres have not been able to provide a complete picture of the GRU structure and operations.

The GRU is the chief intelligence organ of the Soviet Union. Often confused with its major rival, the KGB, the GRU has survived as the most important intelligence service of the Soviet General Staff. Its major function, according to Suvorov, is to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union through the preservation of Soviet state security. To this end, its history has directly paralleled the development and evolution of the Soviet army. From its modest origins, the GRU today commands agent networks worldwide through six vast interdepartmental centers. Each center,or more accurately, directorate, controls various intelligence functions from spy operations to Spetsnaz activities. The directorates, in turn, are in charge of strategic intelligence and operational and tactical intelligence in each of the sixteen districts and the four fleets. Electronic reconnaissance activities and radio intelligence are also included in the vast bureaucratic array performed by the GRU.

In this, his third book dealing with the Soviet Union, Viktor Suvorov provides the first in-depth study of clandestine intelligence organization. His dramatic historical monologue captures the evolution of Soviet Military Intelligence in a manner not previously attempted. In describing the delicate balance played by the army, the Politburo, and the KGB, Suvorov graphically outlines the historical struggles and bloody counter-struggles each has waged in order to perpetuate the balance of power. The GRU, operating as the army's chief functionary, has played an important role in this balancing act. Suvorov emphasizes that this triumvirate system is a necessity in the Soviet authoritarian state.

In the book, Suvorov bares the GRU intelligence structure and its main functions: espionage, foreign military assessment, terrorist activities, deception, and Spetsnaz operations. He describes the workings of a GRU foreign resident and the step by step processes of recruitment of legal and illegal agents in foreign countries.

Using examples from the annals of Western counterespionage, he relates the blunders and accomplishments which have marked the careers of various GRU agents. These prime examples

lend credence to the book, giving the reader the impression that, after all, GRU agents have an enormous responsibility in helping to further Moscow's goals.

Finally, Suvorov points an accusing finger at the West for being complacent about Soviet espionage activities. He states that the Soviet espionage enterprise is perpetuated, even enhanced, by Western pacifist attitudes.

The book is a gigantic expose. It reveals the facts concerning one of the most dangerous organizations pitted against the Free World since World War II. This work obviously will have broad appeal to those military analysts and officials who study Soviet espionage activities. Suvorov's style is straight forward and thorough. It should be required reading for every Western intelligence analyst.

Michael J. Crutchley
Defense Analyst
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McLean, Va.

Real Peace by Richard M. Nixon, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1984, 107 pages.

America's role in the world is no less controversial today than it was a year ago, when foreign policy was dominated by presidential politics and threatened by heightened international tensions. In **Real Peace**, former President Richard Nixon provides us with his blueprint for U.S. foreign policy. This is not a long-winded philosophy lesson, but a hard-hitting, practical roadmap dealing with foreign affairs. It stresses the problems but also the possibilities that the United States will face in the next two to four years.

The writing style closely reflects the personality of the author himself. Its tone is often harsh with a sharp bite reserved for those who incur his disfavor. Nixon puts forth a voice which demands to be heard. His unabashed approach lends clarity and crispness to his prose. It certainly reaches out and grabs the reader's attention.

On the other hand, this combative style means that the reader must also put up with the emotional baggage Nixon still carries from his years as president. He slashes away at the news media and political left labeling them as both gullible and weak. "Perfect peace exists only in the grave and the typewriter," he says, providing one example of his undying enmity toward the institution he felt unjustly drove him from office. He is equally critical of liberals and Democrats, no doubt associating them with the hippies and crazies who demonstrated in front of the White House during the 60's and 70's. Little does Nixon realize that many of these same people have grown up, joined the establishment, and probably work for Merrill Lynch as stockbrokers. "Have you opened your IRA today?" The reader should be aware of these prejudices which may at times seem revolting or nostalgic, depending on one's point of view.

Underneath it all, though, is a moderate, common-sense approach to America's foreign policy problems. Nixon sees the United States and the Soviet Union as the preeminent managers of the world system. He accepts that the Soviet Union and the United States will always

have differences and believes that the only road to peace is through managing conflict by means other than war.

He denounces the "myths of peace": disarmament, world government, trade, and friendship between leaders. These are panaceas that only fools and opportunists resort to.

Real Peace is a continuous process, not a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. It means that the United States will be permanently involved in the world's problems. The United States cannot solve all the outstanding disputes and then retreat to a new form of splendid isolation. It means competing with the Soviet Union on every level, militarily (arms spending), economically, and diplomatically.

Of course, this is easier said than done. Achieving closer coordination on East-West trade policies remains elusive as the Soviet Union attempts to manipulate both Western Europe and Japan. Third World governments tend to be unstable and friendship can never be taken for granted. But Nixon argues that U.S. and Western power is still vast enough to make a difference in many areas and thus is capable of maintaining the peace. His book is a call for political determination and judgment; it implores the Western world to rise from the uncertainty and hesitancy of the 1970s and play the role expected of it. Will and wisdom have to triumph if peace is to be achieved.

Richard Nixon has written an intelligent, lucid account of United States foreign policy problems. I wouldn't recommend the book if the subject was honesty in government. But you cannot deny his expertise and insight in foreign affairs. This book should be required reading for the Reagan administration and all of those interested in "real peace."

1st Lt. Edward S. Shea
Fort Hood, Texas

The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces by David Eshel, New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1985, 208 pages.

The author of this coffee table book, David Eshel, is a retired lieutenant colonel from the Israeli army. According to the author's biography, he is a founding member of the Israeli armored corps, and has held a variety of staff and command assignments, including an active part in all Middle East wars. Additionally, he is the publisher of **Defense Update International** magazine.

The book's cover states that "Combat actions in Lebanon and Grenada are described in detail." This reference, along with the treatment of the subject in general by an authoritative foreign author, hinted at the possibility of an insightful and intelligent study. With this preconceived expectation of the book, I delved into it with great anticipation. Unfortunately, I was disappointed.

The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces contains only passing references to equipment used and to units which participated in Grenada and Lebanon. There is no description of the military adventures in those areas. It also fails to present an in-depth analysis of the forces to which the title refers. It is, however, a worthwhile effort for the purpose of general information.

The book opens with a Middle East scenario into which, naturally, U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces are deployed. The scenario flows from

domestic violence in Kuwait which ultimately leads to a confrontation between Soviet airborne troops and American forces. This area of the book is both informative and exciting reading.

The following section of the book contains a brief history of the evolution of our Rapid Deployment Forces, as well as discussion of intelligence and command, control, and communications in Southwest Asia. The remainder of the book encompasses a series of descriptions of various units which comprise the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces. Some of the units described are the XVIII Airborne Corps, 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, the new High Technology Light Division, Marine Corps assets, and Air Force and Navy contributions. The general information presented here is also useful. It gives the reader an appreciation of the contributions elements involved in this kind of operation would make.

In summary, **The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces** is a well written book. The information presented indicates that the author researched this subject well. The book has hundreds of color photographs depicting equipment that is listed and described. As long as one does not expect too much detail or analysis, this book is worthwhile reading.

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Political/Military Applications of Bayesian Analysis: Methodological Issues by Douglas E. Hunter, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1984, 293 pages.

The goal of the intelligence analyst, whether tactical or strategic, is to reduce the uncertainty associated with the true state of the world, thereby assisting policymakers and commanders in executing their mission. Analyses using qualifiers such as certainly, probably, and possibly, although useful, fall short of potential because these words are ill-defined and subject to varying interpretations. Ironically, the analyst, in attempting to reduce uncertainty, introduces his own brand of uncertainty. Quantitative methods are analytic techniques which reduce the uncertainty associated with intelligence products. Bayesian analysis, the subject of this recent monograph, is one of the more controversial quantitative techniques.

The author, Dr. Douglas Hunter, is a professor at the Defense Intelligence College. During his years of service he has taught a wide variety of intelligence professionals. This has given him the opportunity to see Bayesian analysis applied to numerous intelligence problems by novice analysts as well as seasoned veterans. He has taken this rich experience and developed a well thought-out analysis of the technique. It is to his credit that he attributes some of the ideas to his past students. The result is the most comprehensive treatment of Bayesian analysis yet.

Bayesian analysis acquires its name from Bayes' Theorem which is a result of elementary probability theory. Applied to intelligence problems, Bayesian analysis develops the probability that a hypothesized state of the world exists based upon an observed stream of events. Unlike the traditional method of arriving at, let's say, the possibility of war given a series of events, the Bayesian analyst uses a formula, based on the assumption that the hypothesis is true, to derive the desired possibility of war given the events. Although the process tends to be unnecessarily cumbersome, Bayesian analysis has a strong following and Dr. Hunter explains that it has some significant advantages.

Dr. Hunter begins his book by discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the Bayesian technique. His examples are relevant and highlight the simplicity of the technique. He then develops a simple procedure, suitable for automation. Finally, he devotes the remaining half of his book to a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of Bayesian analysis. Fortunately, for almost all the problems he presents, he also develops reasonable solutions or hints how to avoid the problem. Although his style is burdensome because he removes reference to gender by using "he/she" throughout the text, and his organization frequently forces him to repeat information presented, this is only a small distraction given the depth of analysis he presents.

Dr. Hunter's purpose is to " . . . offer stern warnings about many of the problems and pitfalls that must be considered in order to do a good Bayesian analysis." In my opinion he accomplishes his purpose. First, the emphasis is on good analysis. The author obviously considers no quantitative analysis preferable to bad quantitative analysis. According to Hunter, the analyst who ignorantly applies the technique and improperly presents his results "should be shot." Secondly, his warning about the many pitfalls is amply illustrated since he discusses only nine advantages but 57 problems associated with Bayesian analysis. This is precisely why Bayesian analysis is controversial. Although a very simple technique, it can quickly lead an analyst astray. Dr. Hunter recognizes this marked imbalance, but he does not discard the technique. On the contrary, he demonstrates that Bayesian analysis is a powerful and specialized tool. When improperly used it can produce erroneous results; but when an analyst thoroughly understands the procedure and applies the technique to a problem it is suited for, the technique is of great assistance.

The importance of Dr. Hunter's book is that much of his discussion is not unique to just Bayesian analysis. Many of the issues addressed are relevant to any quantitative method. Even more importantly, many issues are also relevant to intelligence analysis in general. For example, his discussion on properly worded hypotheses and presentation techniques is relevant to many quantitative techniques. Futhermore, his treatment of the significance of non-events, the use of indicator sets, and the need to consider alternate hypotheses provides examples of issues relevant to any general intelligence analysis. Just as quantitative methods help analysts organize their thought processes and break a problem into sets of smaller problems, Dr. Hunter has organized the Bayesian technique and dissected it into manageable pieces. In doing so, he discusses a variety of functions any intelligence analyst must perform.

Every serious intelligence analyst should take a look at this book. It is the kind of book which can be reread several times, and each time something new will catch the reader's attention. If Bayesian analysis is a suitable technique for the problem at hand, then this book can help the analyst implement the technique. If the problem is not suited to Bayesian analysis or if an analyst is not inclined to perform quantitative analysis, then Dr. Hunter's book will help him consider aspects of the problem that he would otherwise have neglected. Dr. Hunter does not settle the controversy surrounding Bayesian analysis, but he provides the reader with sufficient information to draw his own conclusions.

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The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 by Jiri Hochman, New York: Cornell University Press, 253 pages.

Hochman's book covers the crucial period before the outbreak of World War II, a time when the League of Nations attempted to limit German rearmament and preserve world peace. It was also a period which reflected a strong surge in Soviet foreign policy toward the establishment of good political, economic and military relations with Nazi Germany.

In the author's words, "German assistance, both technical and financial, contributed decisively to the construction of the first centers of Soviet military industry, especially the aircraft industry, the chemical industry, and tank production. In return, the Soviet Union was repaying its financial debt to Germany by shipping to that nation large amounts of manganese, which was needed for Germany's rearmament program."

As Hitler's Germany became stronger, Germany's immediate neighbors—Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Romania—began intensive negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov to form a collective alliance for security against German military aggression. Soviet foreign policy during that period was guided by Stalin who wanted at all costs to maintain cordial relations with Hitler's Germany.

The author places a major part of the blame for the failure of collective security for the period, 1934-1938, on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union signed mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia; under the terms of the treaty, the Soviet Union would support those nations, should Germany commit aggression against them. However, the Soviet Union completely ignored Czech requests for military aid in 1938. Likewise when France declared war on Germany in September 1939, the Soviet Union failed again to honor its commitment. When the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed in 1939, each nation received half of Poland, and the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic States (1940) and retook Bessarabia from Romania.

In his book, Hochman states that the relationship between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany destroyed any chance of a viable collective security alliance against Hitler and hastened the onset of World War II.

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THE EQUALIZERS

522d
Military Intelligence Battalion
(CEWI)

The 522d Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) was originally formed as the 522d MI Service Detachment at Fort Bragg, N.C., Sept. 1, 1950. After service in Korea, the detachment was deactivated on Dec. 28, 1951. The unit was again established June 23, 1954, and assigned to an MI battalion activated during July of 1954 for service in the Federal Republic of Germany. The unit was dissolved in 1958 for 18 years.

The 522d MI battalion began service recently at Fort Hood, Texas, on Oct. 21, 1976 as the Army's first Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence battalion. The battalion was constituted using assets from the 502d MI Company, the 373d ASA Company, the 2d Armored Division Signals Security Detachment and the 303d Army Security Agency Battalion. The battalion provides intelligence, electronic warfare, and operations security support to the 2d Armored Division.

Since 1976, the 522d MI Battalion has been recognized throughout the Army as the pacesetter for tactical intelligence and electronic warfare operations. The 522d MI Battalion has participated in all major 2d Armored Division exercises since 1976. The battalion has consistently been called upon to test and evaluate new equipment and concepts for tactical intelligence and electronic warfare support.

The 522d MI Battalion, known as the "equalizer battalion" is ready to deploy anytime and anywhere to support the 2d Armored Division. Its unit members are soldiers first and technicians a close second.

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